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BAIL REFORM AND INTIMATE PARTNER
VIOLENCE IN MAINE
Mac Walton*
ABSTRACT
The bail reform movement is leading to pretrial practice changes across the 
country, largely aimed at reducing pretrial detention rates or uncoupling pretrial 
detention from money.  These reforms often include expanding or formalizing the 
role of actuarial risk assessment tools in bail determinations.  Maine has not enacted 
bail reforms to expressly reduce pretrial detention, but since 2015, Maine courts have 
been using a risk assessment tool in bail decisions in intimate partner violence cases.  
Analysis of risk assessment practices in Kentucky and New Jersey, in comparison 
with the particular considerations in IPV cases, can inform Maine’s current bail 
system and provide models for bail reform.
I. INTRODUCTION
Every Friday afternoon, a district court judge sits in the Capitol Judicial Center 
in Augusta and oversees in-custody arraignments.  The courtroom itself is calm, 
quiet, and nearly empty, a stark contrast to the morning’s in-person arraignment 
proceedings; only the judge, a clerk, one or two prosecutors, and a marshal are 
present, though every few days a defendant’s family will attend.  Sometimes a 
reporter is present as well.  The defendants and their counsel (the “lawyer of the 
day”) are video-teleconferenced in from the Kennebec County Jail next door.
They cycle through on the screen, few arraignments taking more than five 
minutes, the lawyer scrambling to read through the file she’s just been handed, 
usually at the same time the judge obtains her own copy.  The prosecutors are hardly 
better prepared—unless it was their case, they’re just reading the file, too.  An 
arraignment is a sequence of several events—reading of the charge, entry of the plea, 
appointment of counsel—and generally the most contentious is the setting of bail.1
From a defendant’s perspective, everything else can be dealt with down the road, but 
what’s on their mind is going home; the bail is what’s preventing that.  The lawyers 
make their arguments, usually based on the severity of the alleged crime plus any 
aggravating or mitigating circumstances about the defendant, and after a minute or 
two, the judge sets bail.
The judge’s bail determination is governed by a statute, 15 M.R.S.A. § 1026, 
which provides her two primary considerations: (1) there is a presumption of release 
                                                                                                     
* J.D. Candidate, Maine Law School, Class of 2019.  I am grateful to Professor Thea Johnson for 
her support and indispensable editing advice; Judge Eric Walker and others at the Augusta District 
Court for encouraging my early research on this topic; Anne Jordan, Julie Howard, Shawn LaGrega, 
Faye Luppi, and TammyJo Girard for their time and assistance; Jana Kenney and the Editorial Board 
and staff of the Maine Law Review for their hard work and helpful feedback; and my family, always.
1. Bail commissioners can set bail in Maine for most crimes, but any bail set by a bail 
commissioner is reviewable de novo in court upon petition. 15 M.R.S.A. § 1028(1) (1999).
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on personal recognizance or unsecured bond,2 unless (2) a certain cash bail or set of 
nonfinancial conditions is “reasonably necessary” to “ensure the appearance of the 
defendant [at court], . . . [or] ensure the safety of others in the community.”3 To aid 
in her bail decision, the judge is provided a long list of statutory factors to consider.  
The judge also has a wide range of tools to accomplish these goals, divided along 
two axes.  Along the financial axis, from least to most restrictive, a judge may release 
a defendant on their own recognizance or the execution of an unsecured bond, or 
require cash bail.4 Along the nonfinancial axis, a judge may require a defendant to 
comply with a curfew; refrain from consuming alcohol or illegal drugs; have any 
contact with victims or witnesses of the alleged crime; or “any other condition that 
is reasonably necessary to ensure the appearance of the defendant [in court] . . . [or] 
ensure the safety of others in the community.”5
At the end of the day, the judge has broad discretion to set bail conditions and 
amounts.  The judge’s decision may be informed by her work experience, her lived 
experience, the social norms of her peer group, her ideological or moral aspirations, 
and numerous other factors.6 A judge’s assessment of a defendant’s dangerousness 
or flight risk is known as a “clinical” risk assessment, and traditionally it has been 
the default mode of assessing risk and guiding judicial decisionmaking.  But there is 
an alternative to this unabridged judicial discretion with the potential for greater 
fairness: “actuarial” risk assessment,7 which is based on statistically tested and 
verified empirical relationships between objective facts and outcome probabilities.8
A number of states have incorporated actuarial risk assessment into one or several 
parts of their criminal justice regimes, and in 2017, New Jersey became the first state 
to adopt an actuarial risk assessment tool in order to eliminate money bail.
In 2012, Maine passed legislation requiring the adoption of a “validated, 
evidence-based domestic violence risk assessment” for use by police, prosecutors, 
judges, and other officers in opposite-sex intimate partner violence (IPV) cases: the 
Ontario Domestic Assault Risk Assessment (ODARA).9 However, Maine has not 
                                                                                                     
2. An unsecured bond allows the defendant to be released without paying anything, but if they fail 
to appear later or they violate other bail conditions, they forfeit the bond amount.
3. 15 M.R.S.A. § 1026(3)(A) (1999).
4. § 1026(1), (3)(A)(12) (1999); see also STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL RELEASE
§ 10-1.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007).  The Maine Constitution provides that “[no] person shall be bailable 
for crimes which now are, or have been denominated capital offenses since the adoption of the 
Constitution, when the proof is evident or the presumption great, whatever the punishment of the crimes 
may be.” ME. CONST. art. 1, § 10.  A probable cause standard determines when the “proof is evident or 
the presumption great.”  Harnish v. State, 531 A.2d 1264, 1268 (Me. 1987). 
5. § 1026(3)(A)(5), (7), (9), (18) (1999).
6. See William M. Grove & Paul E. Meehl, Comparative Efficiency of Informal (Subjective, 
Impressionistic) and Formal (Mechanical, Algorithmic) Prediction Procedures: The Clinical-Statistical 
Controversy, 2 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 293, 294 (1996) (“the [clinical] method relies on an 
informal, ‘in the head,’ impressionistic, subjective conclusion”).
7. Sometimes known as “evidence-based” risk assessment; I will generally use “actuarial,” 
because it is more precise (clinical risk assessment is still “evidence-based,” after all).
8. Samuel R. Wiseman, Fixing Bail, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 417, 443-44 (2016).
9. An Act to Mandate the Use of Standardized Risk Assessment in the Management of Domestic 
Violence Crimes, P.L. 2011, ch. 680, § 4.  For two reasons, this Comment will generally use the term 
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joined the growing number of jurisdictions using actuarial risk assessment for 
broader pretrial purposes, despite repeated pushes from both the legislature and the 
judiciary.10 In Part I of this Comment, I survey the contemporary bail reform 
movement and the push to adopt actuarial risk assessment in pretrial use.  In Part II, 
I assess the implementation strategies of New Jersey and Kentucky, and describe a 
third approach suggested by scholarship.
In Part III, I describe Maine’s IPV risk assessment tool, and compare and 
distinguish implementation strategies for “general” risk assessment from those for 
IPV risk assessment, as the different contexts implicate different constitutional, 
historical, and social justice concerns.  I argue that Maine’s criminal justice system 
could successfully incorporate actuarial risk assessment into bail practice, but that 
Maine’s experience with ODARA must inform, and remain a part of, bail reform in 
Maine.
II. THE CONTEMPORARY BAIL REFORM MOVEMENT
The practice of pretrial detention—of jailing a person who has not yet been 
convicted of the crime for which he has been arrested—has ancient roots, as does the 
related practice of allowing that person to be released under certain conditions.11
Until the 1960s, bail procedures in the United States were a patchwork of common 
law and statute, with a constitutional provision tossed in for good measure. The Bail 
Reform Act of 1966, passed during that decade’s great wave of liberalization, aimed 
to safeguard the pretrial rights of federal criminal defendants.12 Among other 
changes, the 1966 Act did not permit a judge to consider a defendant’s dangerousness 
in setting bail except in cases involving capital offenses; the primary goal of bail, 
                                                                                                     
“intimate partner violence”: first, because ODARA is validated only in cases of intimate partner 
violence, but not in some other cases that Maine also defines as “domestic violence,” such as parent-
child violence, see 19-A M.R.S.A. § 4002(4) (2012); and second, because the term “domestic violence” 
can trivialize or minimize its seriousness.  However, I will occasionally use the term “domestic 
violence” to facilitate discussions of statutes and historical arguments.  Additionally, ODARA has not 
been adopted for assessment of same-sex relationships, as the developers have not had sufficient sample 
sizes to statistically validate it. N. ZOE HILTON ET AL., RISK ASSESSMENT FOR DOMESTICALLY VIOLENT 
MEN 131-32 (2010).
10. Scattered jurisdictions and police departments were using risk assessment for certain crimes; 
for instance, Saco Police adopted ODARA in 2009 for use in IPV cases.  However, there was little 
broad or systematic use of actuarial risk assessments across the state. An Act to Mandate the Use of 
Standardized Risk Assessment in the Management of Domestic Violence Crimes: Hearing on L.D. 1711 
Before the J. Standing Comm. on Crim. Just. and Pub. Safety, 125th Legis., (Feb. 13, 2012) (testimony 
of TammyJo Girard, Saco Police Department) (on file with author).
11. See generally TIMOTHY R. SCHNACKE ET AL., PRETRIAL JUSTICE INSTITUTE, THE HISTORY OF 
BAIL AND PRETRIAL RELEASE (updated Sept. 24, 2010), 
https://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/ccjj/Committees/BailSub/Handouts/HistoryofBail-Pre-TrialRelease-
PJI_2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Z6L-3SND].  Indeed, the Supreme Court never even addressed bail 
until 1951’s Stack v. Boyle.  In Stack, the Court elucidated the rationale of bail (to ensure “the presence 
of the defendant” at trial) and held that bail “set at a higher figure than an amount reasonably calculated 
to fulfill this purpose is ‘excessive’ under the Eighth Amendment.”  341 U.S. 1, 5 (1951).
12. SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 11, at 12.
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under the 1966 Act, was to ensure the “appearance of the defendant at trial.”13 This 
approach was quickly adopted by many states.14
The crime wave of the 1970s and 80s swung the political pendulum back in an 
authoritarian direction, which culminated at the federal level in the Bail Reform Act
of 1984.  The 1984 Act permitted federal judges to detain defendants whenever 
release might “endanger the safety of any other person or the community.”15 In 1987, 
in United States v. Salerno, the Supreme Court upheld the 1984 Act against Due 
Process and Eighth Amendment challenges.  On the Due Process issue, the Court 
held that pretrial detention for public safety reasons was regulatory, not punitive, 
and, therefore, that the 1984 Act’s procedural safeguards were sufficient to support 
pretrial detention based on a defendant’s dangerousness.16 On the Excessive Bail 
challenge, the Court held that “[n]othing in the text of the Bail Clause limits 
permissible Government considerations solely to questions of flight”;17 in other 
words, pretrial detention could be validly based on “community safety” 
considerations.  In the wake of the 1984 Act and Salerno, and in response to 
increasing crime rates, many states—Maine among them—added community safety 
provisions to their bail codes,18 and public safety is now the conventional lens 
through which most people, both within the criminal justice system and in the world 
at large, view bail.19
Recent years have seen a renewed political and cultural drive to liberalize the 
state and federal bail systems.20 In this part, I survey the reasons for this shift and 
describe the various strategies and goals of the contemporary bail reformers.
                                                                                                     
13. Id. at 14.  See also Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146-3152 (2012).
14. See John S. Goldkamp, Danger and Detention: A Second Generation of Bail Reform, 76 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 8-9 (1985).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) (2012); see also Matthew J. Hegreness, America’s Fundamental and
Vanishing Right to Bail, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 905, 960 (2013).  In 1984, federal prosecutors were more 
focused on immigration, regulatory infractions, and fraud than with drugs or violent crime.  See Marie 
VanNostrand & Gina Keebler, Pretrial Risk Assessment in the Federal Court, 73 FED. PROBATION 3, 4 
(2009) (citing Bureau of Justice Statistics, Compendium of Federal Justice Statistics, 1985 (July 1990)).
16. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747, 752 (1987).  As will be discussed below, the 
challenge in Salerno was only facial, and lower courts have found procedural Due Process violations in 
individual cases.
17. Id. at 754-55.
18. SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 11, at 18 (“By 1999. . . at least 44 states and the District of 
Columbia had statutes that included public safety . . . as an appropriate consideration in the pretrial 
release decision.”).
19. See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Jennifer Gonnerman, Before the Law, NEW YORKER (Oct. 6, 2014), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/06/before-the-law [https://perma.cc/M42L-B7P2] 
(telling the story of Kalief Browder, a black teenager who spent three years incarcerated on Rikers 
Island after being accused of stealing a backpack.  Browder’s family could not afford his bail; he was 
finally released only when the prosecutor dropped the case.  Browder killed himself in 2015.).
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A.  The Problem of Money Bail
Bail systems based on money have long been thought constitutionally dubious,21
but in practice have been deeply resilient.  A combination of factors have inhibited 
reform: tradition;22 the political marginalization of those classes most 
disproportionately affected by bail’s harms;23 and simple cultural inertia (i.e., the lay 
perception that pretrial practice simply is cash bail).  Recently, however, the 
movement has been reinvigorated by increased public awareness of the normative 
and policy problems of money bail specifically, and the American criminal justice 
system generally.24
Cash bail, as currently practiced in most jurisdictions, raises several 
constitutional issues, even after Salerno.  First, a money bail system will inevitably 
“cause[] individuals to be jailed simply because they lack the financial means to 
make a bail payment”; this “wealth-based distinction” violates Equal Protection and 
Due Process principles.25 It is generally recognized that bail practices that “result in 
incarceration based on poverty” violate the Constitution.26 A jurisdiction may not, 
therefore, “systematically” impose secured money bail on impoverished defendants 
as a de facto pretrial detention order.27 Even a nominally constitutional process relies 
                                                                                                     
21. See generally Jeff Thaler, Punishing the Innocent: The Need for Due Process and the 
Presumption of Innocence Prior to Trial, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 441 (1978).
22. Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to be Monitored, 123 YALE L.J. 1344, 
1352 (2014).
23. See Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention, Punishment, & the 
Sixth Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1297, 1359-61 (2012).
24. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW (2010); Udi Ofer, We Can’t End Mass 
Incarceration Without Ending Money Bail, ACLU.ORG (Dec. 11, 2017), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/mass-incarceration/smart-justice/we-cant-end-mass-incarceration-without-
ending-money-bail [https://perma.cc/SA4H-7AU6].
25. CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, MOVING BEYOND MONEY: A
PRIMER ON BAIL REFORM 6 (2016), http://cjpp.law.harvard.edu/publications/primer-bail-reform 
[https://perma.cc/8B8K-VSH8] [hereinafter MOVING BEYOND MONEY]; see also TIMOTHY R.
SCHNACKE, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS, FUNDAMENTALS OF BAIL 11-13 (Aug. 2014),
http://clebp.org/images/2014-11-05_final_bail_fundamentals_september_8,_2014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5SZJ-VFZ8] (listing normative reasons that money bail leads to “unnecessary” pretrial 
detention).
26. Vanita Gupta & Lisa Foster, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Dear Colleague Letter 
7 (Mar. 14, 2016), https://www.tmcec.com/files/7614/8517/9751/00_-
_Regan__Robby_BINER_Special_Session.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8MB-D8L3]; see also Odonnell v. 
Harris Cty., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1160 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (“The constitutional problem . . . arises from 
rigid adherence to imposing secured money bail when that will obviously result in, and is often intended 
to effect, pretrial detention of indigent defendants charged only with misdemeanors who are eligible for 
release under Texas law.”); Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr. et al. to Brian E. Frosh, Md. Att’y 
Gen. (Oct. 3, 2016), 
http://home.ubalt.edu/id86mp66/PTJC/SymposiumReadings/Covington_MD_Wealth-
Based_Pretrial_Detention_White_Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/2UQF-46Q6].
27. Odonnell, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1156 (finding that Harris County systematically imposed secured 
money bail on “indigent misdemeanor arrestees,” and holding that such practice violated Equal 
Protection and Due Process Clauses), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 882 F.3d 528 (5th Cir. 2018); see also 
United States v. McConnell, 842 F.2d 105, 109 (5th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that at least under the 
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on an equation that is “complicated in theory and oversimplified in practice.” Using 
three abstract factors—the defendant’s perceived dangerousness, flight/FTA risk, 
and financial means—judges must set bail amounts and conditions.28 However, the 
Supreme Court has not directly addressed a challenge to money bail systems on these 
grounds.29
Second, the arbitrary setting of money bail arguably violates procedural Due 
Process.30 In Salerno, the federal 1984 Bail Reform Act was upheld against a facial 
Due Process challenge, in part because of the government’s “legitimate and 
compelling” interest in community safety, but also because of the Act’s “extensive” 
procedural safeguards: the right to counsel at bail hearings; the requirement that 
pretrial officers make “written findings of fact and . . . reasons” supporting their 
decision; and the requirement that a defendant’s dangerousness or flight risk be 
proved by clear and convincing evidence.31 Most state and municipal jurisdictions 
do not provide these safeguards;32 Maine’s only procedural protection is to require 
that a judge conduct an “interview with the defendant.”33 The judge need not even 
state their rationale for imposing bail; their bail determination is presumptively 
reasonable.34
Despite these constitutional infirmities, “[b]ail has been stubbornly resistant to 
constitutional challenges.”35 For the foreseeable future, the more likely path to 
reform is through legislation or administrative policy changes grounded on the 
normative problems with money bail.  The recent renewal of serious political36 and 
                                                                                                     
federal Bail Reform Act of 1984, Congress “[proscribed] the setting of a high bail as a de facto
automatic detention practice”).
28. Thaler, supra note 21, at 443.
29. In Salerno, the Court tipped its hat to the “modern practice of requiring a bail bond or the 
deposit of a sum of money” in order to ensure a defendant’s reappearance, but it did not then, and has 
not since, considered whether the systematic imposition of cash bail (e.g., a bail schedule) might raise 
Equal Protection or Due Process issues. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 764-65.  It is also notable that the 
challenge in Salerno was facial, so it is unclear what, if any, circumstances might lead to a violation, see 
id. at 745, although the Fifth Circuit has recently held that the government’s efficiency concerns obviate 
a constitutional requirement that indigent detainees are entitled to anything more than a magistrate 
“specifically [enunciating] their individualized, case-specific reasons” for imposing de facto pretrial 
detention. Odonnell, 882 F.3d at 542.
30. Appleman, supra note 23, at 1304.
31. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 752; see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (leading case 
on procedural Due Process requirements). 
32. See Cynthia E. Jones, “Give Us Free”: Addressing Racial Disparities in Bail Determinations,
16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 919, 930-31 (2017); see also Stack v. Boyle, 341 U.S. 1, 11 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (“Fixing bail . . . is a serious exercise of judicial discretion [that is] often . . 
.done in haste.”).  In 2017, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that a judge must provide 
“findings of fact and a statement of reasons” for their decision to set bail that the defendant is unlikely to 
have means to pay.  Branagh v. Commonwealth, 80 N.E.3d 949, 964 (Mass. 2017).
33. 15 M.R.S.A. § 1026(4) (2012).
34. See State v. Felch, 2007 ME 88, ¶ 9, 928 A.2d 1252.
35. Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification, 115 MICH. L. REV. 585, 627 (2017).  But cf. Branagh, 80 
N.E.3d 949.
36. See Kamala Harris & Rand Paul, To Shrink Jails, Let’s Reform Bail, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/20/opinion/kamala-harris-and-rand-paul-lets-reform-bail.html 
[https://perma.cc/FME4-HE55].
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public37 interest in reforming money bail systems is therefore encouraging.  But why 
now?  One obvious factor is the long-term decline in violent crime, propelling the 
criminal justice reform movement generally; in 2015, the nationwide crime rate was 
“about half of what it was at its height in 1991.”38 The decrease in violent crime, 
and the concomitant decrease in public anxiety and fear of violent crime, has altered 
the public discourse around criminal justice.  Unnecessary pretrial detention imposes 
“intensely negative consequences on individuals [and] communities”39: it can have 
criminogenic and plea-inducing effects on defendants and impose significant 
financial burdens on their families.40 Money bail systems have historically been 
prone to other abuses as well: one of the primary tactics of the 1963 civil rights 
demonstrators in Birmingham, Alabama, led by Martin Luther King, Jr., was to be 
arrested en masse and overwhelm the Birmingham jails.41 The Alabama legislature 
hastily raised the bail limit for misdemeanors in Birmingham alone from $300 to 
$2500, which successfully confounded the demonstrators’ ability to carry out this 
tactic.42
Perhaps a more important reason for bail reform’s political momentum is, 
ironically, the current system’s budgetary impact. Money bail can “lead to significant 
levels of unnecessary jailing,”43 funding for which must come from state and 
municipal budgets (budgets that have, in turn, been strained by the cost of mass 
incarceration generally).44 Financial concerns can provide a hook with which liberal 
politicians can find bipartisan support for criminal justice reform.45 We see this in 
the pretrial context as well: Senators Kamala Harris (D-CA) and Rand Paul (R-KY) 
have jointly advocated for national bail reform.46
Even in its more innocuous forms, money bail implicates troubling cultural 
norms—many of us are simply uncomfortable with what cash bail reveals about our 
social, legal, and economic structures.47 Unjust bail practices, such as the idea that 
                                                                                                     
37. See, e.g., Gonnerman, supra note 20.
38. Inimai Chettier, Foreword to OLIVER ROEDER ET AL., BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, WHAT 
CAUSED THE CRIME DECLINE?, at 3 (2015), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/What_Caused_The_Crime_Decline.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W3SK-QE4A].
39. MOVING BEYOND MONEY, supra note 25, at 6.  This is not to mention, of course, the strain (to 
put it mildly) that overcrowding puts on detainees themselves: sanitation issues and deprivation of food 
and sleep, among other abuses. See Appleman, supra note 23, at 1315 (listing jail problems associated 
with overcrowding).  Political bodies, sadly but perhaps inevitably, tend to emphasize the budgetary 
costs instead of the humanitarian ones.
40. See Wiseman, supra note 22, at 1354-58.
41. David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Martin Luther King, Walker v. City of Birmingham, and the 
Letter from Birmingham Jail, 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 791, 802-03 (1993).
42. Id. at 805.
43. MOVING BEYOND MONEY, supra note 25, at 6.
44. See Mary D. Fan, Beyond Budget-Cut Criminal Justice: The Future of Penal Law, 90 N.C. L.
REV. 581, 595-96 (2012).
45. See id. at 634. 
46. Harris & Paul, supra note 36.
47. For example, when Sandra Bland died in a Texas jail after being arrested during a minor traffic 
stop, her family sued the jail officials.  The officials argued, among other things, that Bland had 
committed suicide because she “was distraught because family and friends failed to post her [$515 
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the cash bail amount should have a linear relationship to the severity of the charged 
crime, are deeply embedded in American culture.48 Judges in popular culture—think 
Law & Order or My Cousin Vinny—will set cash bail amounts based solely on a 
defendant’s perceived flight risk or dangerousness (and assess dangerousness solely 
on the nature of the charged crime) without considering their financial capacity.49
Judges and prosecutors may understand, intellectually, that such practices are 
unconstitutional; but in a bail system predicated on the exchange of money for 
freedom, and in a culture that normalizes and reinforces the practice, institutional 
inertia may be hard to overcome.
In recent years, several states have passed laws or other reforms restricting or 
discouraging the use of a money bail system; a movement is clearly afoot.50 Yet 
despite the rapid erosion of money bail’s reputation in light of its many negative 
consequences, no jurisdiction has yet succeeded in fully eliminating money bail.51
B.  The Promise of Actuarial Risk Assessment
In contrast to money bail’s painfully slow abrogation, use of actuarial risk 
assessment tools has been expanding rapidly across the country.52 Actuarial analysis 
is not new in the court system,53 but technology has made it easier and cheaper to 
use in pretrial and arraignment settings,54 and automated actuarial risk assessment is 
“enjoying its heyday in criminal justice.”55 Actuarial tools are a distinct subcategory 
of bail reform, but they can make it politically and pragmatically easier to accomplish 
other reforms. For instance, they are a handy counter to arguments that without 
                                                                                                     
bail].”  Clifford Ward, Failure To Be Bonded Out Led Sandra Bland to Suicide, Jail Officials Allege,
CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 12, 2015, 5:41 p.m.), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-sandra-bland-court-
motions-met-20151112-story.html [https://perma.cc/V65Z-58W4].
48. See SCHNACKE, supra note 25, at 93.
49. See, e.g., Law & Order: Special Victims Unit: Spring Awakening (NBC television broadcast 
May 21, 2014).
50. See MOVING BEYOND MONEY, supra note 25, at 7 (surveying states).
51. The federal and Washington, D.C. systems are different: their bail statutes are based on 
“release/no release” options, and therefore “[forbid] financial conditions that result in the preventive 
detention of the defendant.”  SCHNACKE, supra note 25, at 29.  The new New Jersey system, likewise, 
does not completely foreclose the possibility of using money as security, although it does go further in 
that direction than any other state. See infra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
52. MOVING BEYOND MONEY, supra note 25, at 20.
53. See, e.g. J. Scott Kohler, Case 29: Vera Institute of Justice: Manhattan Bail Project, in JOEL L.
FLEISHMAN ET AL., CASEBOOK FOR THE FOUNDATION: A GREAT AMERICAN SECRET 81 (2007), 
http://cspcs.sanford.duke.edu/learning-resources/publications/casebook-foundation-great-american-
secret [https://perma.cc/76YZ-D9DM] (describing the Vera Institute of Justice’s 1961 project providing 
“objective” risk assessment in Manhattan courts); Christopher T. Lowenkamp & Jay Whetzel, The 
Development of an Actuarial Risk Assessment Instrument for U.S. Pretrial Services, 73-SEP FED. PROB.
33, 34 (Sept. 2009); Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 97, 117-
119 (1984) (surveying the actuarial tools in use in criminal justice systems in 1984).
54. Issie Lapowsky, One State’s Bail Reform Exposes the Promise and Pitfalls of Tech-Driven 
Justice, WIRED.COM (Sept. 5, 2017, 7:00 a.m.), https://www.wired.com/story/bail-reform-tech-justice 
[https://perma.cc/JM6H-GMZY].
55. Melissa Hamilton, Risk-Needs Assessment: Constitutional and Ethical Challenges, 52 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 231, 233 (2015).
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money bail, we would have no reliable system to identify dangerous or flight-risk 
defendants.  But even within money bail systems, actuarial tools offer independent 
benefits as well.56
First, a definition: an actuarial decisionmaking model is one that bases decisions 
on empirical relationships between inputs and outcomes, after those relationships 
have been statistically tested and verified.57 By contrast, a clinical decisionmaking 
model is one in which decisions are based on a professional’s (e.g., a judge, 
psychologist, or probation officer) informal synthesis of relevant information, and is 
guided by professional and lived experience, theoretical and ideological perspective, 
knowledge of research studies, clinical observations, and other inputs that are often 
grouped together under the umbrella term “professional judgment.”58
In the last two decades, as part of the criminal justice reform movement, a shift 
towards actuarial risk assessment in pretrial practice has accelerated.59 Beginning in 
2003, with Virginia’s development and adoption of a risk assessment tool for pretrial 
use,60 jurisdictions across the country have been reforming their pretrial justice 
systems to incorporate use of these tools.61 Several states, including New Jersey, 
Kentucky, and Arizona, currently rely on actuarial risk assessment tools in setting 
bail, and numerous other jurisdictions “are pursuing or have recently implemented 
wholesale changes to their bail practices.”62 These reforms are being enacted 
through various means, such as wholesale statutory change, new court rules, law 
enforcement agency action, or “as the result of civil rights litigation.”63 Risk 
assessment tools have also been adopted, more controversially, for use in 
sentencing.64
                                                                                                     
56. See MOVING BEYOND MONEY, supra note 25, at 20.
57. HILTON ET AL., supra note 9, at 28-29.
58. Id.; see also Wiseman, supra note 8, at 439-40.
59. PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., THE STATE OF PRETRIAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 5 (Nov. 2017), 
https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=f9
d452f6-ac5a-b8e7-5d68-0969abd2cc82&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/25DF-QMK9]; see also
Joseph E. Kennedy, The Jena Six, Mass Incarceration, and the Remoralization of Civil Rights, 44 Harv. 
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 477, 507-08 (2009); see generally ALEXANDER, supra note 24.
60. See MARIE VANNOSTRAND & KENNETH J. ROSE, PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT IN VIRGINIA, 9
(May 1, 2009), 
https://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/sites/dcjs.virginia.gov/files/publications/corrections/virginia-pretrial-risk-
assessment-report.pdf.
61. PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., supra note 59, at 5.
62. Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in Action, 103 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) 
(manuscript at 13), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3016088 
[https://perma.cc/XG35-EC6Z]; James Brooks, Goodbye Bail: Alaska Switches to New System of 
Criminal Justice, JUNEAU EMPIRE (Dec. 20, 2017), http://juneauempire.com/state/news/2017-12-
20/goodbye-bail-alaska-switches-new-system-criminal-justice [https://perma.cc/HR5Z-MNKV].
63. Stevenson, supra note 62 (manuscript at 12); see also PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., WHERE
PRETRIAL IMPROVEMENTS ARE HAPPENING (updated Oct. 2018), 
https://university.pretrial.org/viewdocument/where-pretrial-improvements-are-hap-2
[https://perma.cc/8RXW-73F4] (collecting jurisdictional changes).
64. Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination,
66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 806 (2014); see also Anna Maria Barry-Jester et al., The New Science of 
Sentencing, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Aug. 4, 2015), 
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There is some dispute as to whether actuarial tools are preferable, in practice, to 
judicial decisionmaking or to other, more democratic processes such as community 
bail funds.65 There is a broad consensus that fully validated actuarial models are 
more “accurate” —meaning they predict an outcome more frequently—than the 
informal, clinical model of traditional judicial decisionmaking.66 Lacking actuarial 
tools, in other words, judges are already doing “risk assessment”; but the traditional 
tools of judicial risk assessment, such as life experience and demeanor and credibility 
inferences, are neither as accurate nor as unbiased as statistically-derived risk 
assessment tools.67 This is doubly true when practical and cost constraints are 
factored into the equation.68 Bail determinations are made very quickly—usually, a 
judge reviewing a bail commissioner’s decision has only a few minutes to assess and 
rule on a defendant’s risk69—and on fairly scant information, at least compared to 
sentencing decisions.70 And what information a judge does have can be problematic: 
the impact of implicit racial bias on bail determinations is well documented.71
What’s more, resource constraints exacerbate some of the problems with judicial 
bail-setting.  Erroneous clinical assessments do not only affect the low-risk 
defendants who are unnecessarily detained: the resources spent detaining or 
monitoring low-risk defendants are unavailable to supervise higher-risk defendants, 
who may therefore be improvidently released.  Actuarial tools, by increasing 
accuracy, can reduce marginal errors on both sides of this equation, and thus allow 
more efficient resource use.72
The increased adoption of actuarial tools may also have a positive cycle effect, 
                                                                                                     
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/08/04/the-new-science-of-sentencing [https://perma.cc/R93D-
39VB].
65. See generally Simonson, supra note 35.
66. Wiseman, supra note 8, at 439-40, 441 n.140, 445; William M. Grove et al., Clinical Versus 
Mechanical Prediction: A Meta-Analysis, 19 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 19, 26 (2000). But see Starr, supra
note 64, at 852 (“[W]hile scores of studies have found that actuarial prediction methods outperform 
clinical judgment, this finding is not universal, the average accuracy edge is not drastic, and the vast 
majority of studies are from wholly different contexts (such as medical diagnosis or business failure 
prediction).”).
67. To be sure, actuarial analysis may simply provide “scientific” cover for structural or systemic 
biases, and thus impede efforts to effect more fundamental change. See Starr, supra note 64, at 866.  
Those arguments are beyond this paper’s scope, but it is worth noting that at least one study has found 
no expansion in racial disparities, though in somewhat unusual circumstances. See Stevenson, supra
note 62 (manuscript at 54).
68. See Grove et al., supra note 66, at 26 (“On balance, the basic assumption that mechanical 
prediction is cheapest, and hence to be preferred when it and clinical prediction perform about equally 
well, seems sound . . . .”)
69. See, e.g., Douglas L. Colbert et al., Do Attorneys Really Matter? The Empirical and Legal Case 
for the Right of Counsel at Bail , 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1719, 1755 (2002) (observing that the presence 
of an attorney at a Baltimore bail review hearing increased the hearing’s duration from one minute and 
forty-seven seconds to two minutes and thirty-seven seconds).
70. Jones, supra note 32, at 943.
71. Id. at 944.
72. See Christopher Slobogin, Plea Bargaining and the Substantive and Procedural Goals of 
Criminal Justice: From Retribution and Adversarialism to Preventive Justice and Hybrid-
Inquisitorialism, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1505, 1536 (2016).
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by highlighting problems with the traditional money bail system and judicial risk 
assessment.  Because the imposition of high money bail as a “de facto automatic 
detention practice” is unconstitutional,73 money bail systems can only be 
constitutionally justified if there is a rational relationship not just between the 
defendant’s risk level and the money bail amount, but the defendant’s financial 
means as well.74 If early indications from New Jersey’s de facto elimination of
money bail are accurate—that is, that an actuarial analysis-based system can reduce 
pretrial detention rates without a concomitant increase in rearrest rates75—then the 
problems with judicial risk assessment and money bail will be even more 
unavoidable.  Relatedly, as judges are confronted with actuarial assessments that 
confound their own assessments, they may become more receptive to the use of 
actuarial analysis, and more skeptical of judicial assessments (or, at least, of those 
judicial assessments made under the time and information constraints of 
arraignments and bail hearings).76
1.  Concerns
There are both constitutional and normative criticisms of actuarial tools in the 
criminal justice system.  The prototypical constitutional argument is that the actuarial 
risk assessment tools discriminate based on suspect characteristics.77   None of the 
tools currently in common use explicitly consider race, but they often use factors that 
function as proxies for race or other suspect classifications.  Furthermore, an 
indispensable component of every currently available tool is the defendant’s criminal 
history—so a defendant who suffers the effects of, e.g., systemic racial bias will 
suffer those effects anew when he is scored by an actuarial tool.  However, under 
current Equal Protection doctrine, only facially discriminatory laws must survive 
strict scrutiny; facially neutral laws that have a disparate impact are given rational 
basis review, even if those disparities are known and understood by lawmakers.78 It 
                                                                                                     
73. United States v. McConnell, 842 F.2d 105, 109 (5th Cir. 1988).
74. See, e.g., Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1057 (5th Cir. 1978) (“Such [bail] requirement as 
is necessary to provide reasonable assurance of the accused’s presence at trial is constitutionally 
permissible. Any requirement in excess of that amount would be inherently punitive and run afoul of 
due process requirements.”).  Salerno did not abrogate this necessary relationship—it merely expanded 
the range of legitimate government interests to include community safety.
75. See infra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
76. It is pointed out, often to good effect, that the risks may run oppositely: that is, that judges will 
be skeptical of the actuarial score when it conflicts with their own analysis, and therefore will be more 
willing to override the score, see Stevenson, supra note 62 (manuscript at 51); or that judges will 
become so reliant on the actuarial analysis that they will be unwilling to override it even when it is 
clearly erroneous (as in the case of Edward French; see infra notes 112-13 and accompanying text).  
77. See, e.g., Starr, supra note 64, at 828-29.
78. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976).  Disparately impactful risk 
assessments may be more constitutionally defensible in the pretrial setting, where they are being used to 
regulate, rather than punish.  It is also worth noting that 2016’s Pena-Rodriguez decision may 
foreshadow a shift in Equal Protection doctrine, at least as far as racial disparate impact is concerned. 
Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 868 (2017) (“This Court’s decisions demonstrate that 
racial bias implicates unique historical, constitutional, and institutional concerns.”).  For an exploration 
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should go without saying that while the disparate impact argument may not be 
persuasive as grounds for a constitutional challenge, we should carefully consider 
any negative impacts as a policy matter.79
A related argument is that actuarial tools violate criminal justice principles by 
considering a defendant’s economic circumstances, for instance, whether or not that 
defendant has a job.  While classifications based on wealth are not suspect in most 
contexts, there is a jurisprudential strain supporting heightened scrutiny for such 
discrimination in the criminal justice context, grounded in both equal protection and 
due process concerns.80 Furthermore, as a normative matter it seems hypocritical to 
adopt a pretrial risk assessment tool expressly to try to reduce the wealth-based 
injustices wrought by a money bail system, only for that risk assessment tool, in turn, 
to consider socioeconomic status in determining pretrial detention.  It may be 
unsatisfactory to answer that judicial risk assessment is no better, but to the extent 
that disparities continue to exist under actuarial risk assessment, we can at least be 
mildly comforted that they no longer arise from mere hunch.81
In addition to these constitutional questions, there are two policy issues that risk 
assessment proponents must overcome: a dignity concern, and a legitimacy concern. 
The dignity concern stems from the foundational criminal justice principle that 
“[o]ur law punishes people for what they do, not who they are.”82 Essentially, the 
argument is that a person’s situation in the criminal justice system should depend 
only on the choices he has actually made, rather than on his likelihood of committing 
future crimes, and that to allow statistical prediction to control criminal justice 
outcomes would be an “insult to autonomy.”83 But the dignity concern has much 
more traction in the sentencing context than in the pretrial context.  As a 
constitutional matter, Salerno already authorizes courts to consider dangerousness in 
setting bail, at least to the extent that pretrial detention is regulatory, not punitive.  
Assuming that the government has an interest in preventing crime from occurring, 
then the fact of a person’s arrest (assuming adequate Fourth Amendment protections, 
probable cause, and the rest) is a sufficient predicate to an inquiry into the 
defendant’s dangerousness.  Statistical analysis simply makes that inquiry more 
accurate; it does not make it more likely to occur.
The legitimacy concern evades easy description, but it seems to largely stem 
                                                                                                     
of disparate impact jurisprudence in the era of Big Data, see Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big 
Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109 (2017).
79. Starr, supra note 64, at 838.  ODARA’s developers took care to avoid even disparate impacts 
by race, though they caution that the tool’s impacts may vary in different jurisdictions with different 
populations. See HILTON ET AL., supra note 9, at 129-30.
80. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956) (plurality opinion) (striking down Illinois 
statute requiring defendants to pay transcript costs for preparation of appeal).
81. This may sound mealymouthed, but this paper aims to stay within the realm of relatively short-
term political possibility.
82. Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 778 (2017).
83. Christopher Slobogin, Principles of Risk Assessment: Sentencing and Policing, 15 OH. ST. J.
CRIM. L. 583, 592 (2018). For an extended discussion of compatibilism and free will in criminal justice, 
see Adam J. Kolber, Free Will as a Matter of Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND 
NEUROSCIENCE 9 (Michael Pardo & Dennis Patterson eds., 2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2660457 [https://perma.cc/R8Q9-XRGZ].
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from a broad discomfort with technological intrusion into quintessentially human 
spheres.84 Criminal justice, even more than these other areas of law (such as driving 
and autonomous vehicles, addressed below) reaches morality’s deepest roots, 
implicates questions of identity and free will,85 and forces us to explicitly question 
what we want society to look like.  It is therefore understandable that we might resist 
or fear technological encroachment into that domain.
While not a criminal justice concern, the spread of autonomous vehicles—and 
the subsequent public reaction—provides a useful illustration of this resistance.  
Human drivers cause nearly 40,000 motor vehicle accident fatalities every year,86
over ninety percent of which are attributed to human errors— “intoxication, 
inattention, sleepiness, or extreme speeding” —that autonomous cars will avoid. 87
Autonomous cars will never be risk-free, but it is clear at this point that, properly 
regulated, replacing human drivers with autonomous vehicles will save many lives 
and billions of dollars.  Yet the general public remains profoundly wary of 
autonomous vehicles.88
To be sure, a wild, rapid, and unregulated expansion of autonomous vehicles 
could do significant damage,89 both in delaying the achievement of long-term 
benefits and in immediate human cost and suffering. Furthermore, there are 
legitimate reasons to be skeptical that regulation will be forthcoming, let alone 
sufficient.90 Similarly, despite growing political and academic support for actuarial 
risk assessment, many media outlets remain wary of it.91 But with autonomous 
                                                                                                     
84. See, e.g., Megan Stevenson, Risk Assessment: The Devil’s in the Details,
THECRIMEREPORT.ORG (Aug. 31, 2017), https://thecrimereport.org/2017/08/31/does-risk-assessment-
work-theres-no-single-answer [https://perma.cc/Y792-6MHM].
85. See Kolber, supra note 83, at 14-15.
86. Neal E. Boudette, U.S. Traffic Deaths Rise for a Second Straight Year, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/15/business/highway-traffic-safety.html 
[https://perma.cc/37HP-GYUQ].
87. Harry Surden & Mary-Anne Williams, Technological Opacity, Predictability, and Self-Driving 
Cars, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 135 (2016).
88. See Jack Barkenbus, People Aren’t Ready for Self-Driving Cars, CITYLAB.COM (Jan. 4, 2018), 
https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2018/01/autonomous-vehicles-consumer-backlash/549650 
[https://perma.cc/DL6H-GRSY].  While there are alternative explanations for certain data—for instance, 
that people actually just enjoy driving, or fear job losses as professional drivers are replaced—most 
surveys indicate substantial concerns with the very safety of autonomous vehicles, despite clear 
evidence to the contrary.
89. In the early twentieth century, a lack of precautionary regulation led to enormous amounts of 
human suffering. See, e.g., Achievements in Public Health, 1900-1999 Motor-Vehicle Safety: A 20th 
Century Public Health Achievement, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL (May 14, 1999), 
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm4818a1.htm [https://perma.cc/G3W4-D8HA]; Bill 
Loomis, 1900-1930: The Years of Driving Dangerously, DETROIT NEWS (Apr. 26, 2015), 
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan-history/2015/04/26/auto-traffic-history-
detroit/26312107 [https://perma.cc/GGC2-8DZZ].  Those who do not learn history and all that.
90. Cecilia Kang, Where Self-Driving Cars Go to Learn, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/11/technology/arizona-tech-industry-favorite-self-driving-hub.html 
[https://perma.cc/EA5T-YBDF].
91. See, e.g., Eric Westervelt, Did a Bail Reform Algorithm Contribute to This San Francisco 
Man’s Murder?, NPR.COM (Aug. 18, 2017, 2:00 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/08/18/543976003/did-
a-bail-reform-algorithm-contribute-to-this-san-francisco-man-s-murder [https://perma.cc/D597-HZFA]; 
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vehicles, as with actuarial risk assessment, the abstraction is almost beside the point: 
whether we prefer an imperfect unknown (actuarial risk assessment) to an imperfect 
known (judicial risk assessment) will primarily depend on how “imperfect” the 
unknown item is, not on the abstract difference between the unknown and known.  
And if there is a good chance that careful regulation and implementation of the 
unknown will produce something better than what we have, we do a disservice in 
downplaying the positive outcomes that might be achieved.
One additional factor is that providing judges with actuarial analysis might 
further erode the distinction between flight risk and dangerousness in bail 
determinations.  The merger of flight risk and dangerousness in judicial bail 
determinations has long been criticized,92 but actuarial tools threaten to reinforce and 
anoint it—most widely-used pretrial risk assessment tools perform just the one 
inquiry.93 Actuarial tools may increase the salience of dangerousness in judicial 
decisionmaking for several reasons: the public discourse around risk assessment 
focuses almost exclusively on dangerousness;94 judicial reliance on the “availability 
heuristic,” that is, the “tendency to measure the probability of an event ‘by the ease 
with which instances or occurrences can be brought to mind’”;95 and rampant 
doctrinal and statutory confusion as to where and how, exactly, the flight risk and 
dangerousness inquiries diverge.96 Under Salerno, however, dangerousness is only 
a permissible criterion for setting bail under certain limited circumstances.97
Furthermore, merging the dangerousness and flight risk inquiries reduces judicial 
accountability and legitimacy.98 However, these problems arise from judicial 
discretion, and could be reduced by a rule-based bail system.  A bail commission, 
for instance, with its greater resources, broader perspective, and ability to make 
ongoing adjustments, would be far more able to weigh the actual flight and 
dangerousness risks in setting its rules than judges currently can, given their time 
and resource constraints.99
At the end of the day, the more compelling concerns about actuarial risk 
                                                                                                     
Replacing Bail with an Algorithm, ECONOMIST (Nov. 23, 2017), 
https://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21731631-new-jersey-has-bold-experiment-reduce-
number-people-jail-awaiting [https://perma.cc/TSY3-WRQV]; Lapowsky, supra note 54.
92. See Lauryn P. Gouldin, Disentangling Flight Risk from Dangerousness, 2016 BYU L. REV.
837, 842 n.19 (2016) (collecting historical critiques).
93. Id. at 870-71.  The most popular tool, the Arnold Foundation’s PSA-Court, does perform 
separate analyses.
94. See, e.g., Westervelt, supra note 91.
95. Lauryn P. Gouldin, When Deference is Dangerous: The Judicial Role in Material-Witness 
Detentions, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1333, 1363 (2012) (quoting Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1127 (1974)).
96. See Gouldin, supra note 92, at 873, 882-83 (“[M]any statutes do a poor job of guiding judges 
about which risks are relevant to different pretrial decisions.”).
97. See id. at 876-77.
98. Id. at 892 (“Strangely, many risk assessment tools that have been proposed gather separate data 
for those defendants who commit crimes on release and for those who fail to appear, but then combine 
that data into a single prediction of ‘pretrial failure.’  It is difficult for that feedback to be properly 
incorporated by judges . . . .”).
99. Id. at 891 & n.253.
154 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1
 
assessment tools instruct us not to avoid them entirely, but rather to carefully 
consider how, and by whom, the tools are constructed and employed.
III. EMBEDDING ACTUARIAL RISK ASSESSMENT IN LAW
Despite the growing academic and political support for evidence-based risk 
assessment, there is “a sore lack of research on the impacts of risk assessment in 
practice.”100 Additionally, there has been little examination of the actual policies and 
practices of reform, or how particular implementation strategies and tactics might 
alter the effectiveness of risk assessment tools on the ground.  One forthcoming paper 
studies bail outcomes in Kentucky and concludes that a statutory mandate that judges 
consider a risk assessment score did not lead to “the dramatic efficiency gains 
predicted by risk assessment’s champions”;101 at the same time, there is evidence that 
New Jersey’s risk assessment implementation has moved the needle it sought to 
move.102 It is obvious that specific implementation strategies and tactics will affect 
risk assessment’s efficacy: simply providing judges with actuarial risk analysis 
scores will not fulfill the tools’ promise, and may even backfire.
A. Sources of Bail Law
Within any given jurisdiction, there are numerous sources of law governing bail 
practices: Supreme Court precedent, state constitutions, state supreme court 
precedent, state statutes, local ordinances, court rules, and administrative 
regulations.103 This thicket complicates the implementation of risk assessment tools, 
not only by necessitating political plate-spinning104 but by raising questions of where 
and how decisions should be made.  For instance, should non-financial conditions of 
release be determined through judicial operation and the adversarial process; or by a 
pretrial services agency; or by the legislature through the imposition of bail 
guidelines (discussed further below); or by some combination thereof?105 Which 
actors should have access to risk assessment scores?  Maine faces these questions 
both in assessing the efficacy of its ODARA implementation and in considering bail 
reform in the future.
Further complicating the implementation question is the fact that, while most 
states administer pretrial services through some sort of agency, the legal form, 
structure, and authority of these agencies varies widely.  In some states and at the 
federal level, pretrial services are administered through the state administrative 
office of the courts;106 in other states, the responsibility and authority to administer 
                                                                                                     
100. Stevenson, supra note 62 (manuscript at 27).
101. Id. (manuscript at 57).
102. PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., supra note 59, at 4.
103. SCHNACKE, supra note 25, at 42.
104. New Jersey’s 2017 bail reforms involved statutory changes, new and modified court rules, 
administrative and agency directives, and a constitutional amendment.
105. See Wiseman, supra note 8, at 422 n.22. 
106. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3152 (2014); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:162-25 (2014).
2018] BAIL REFORM 155
 
pretrial services is delegated to counties and cities;107 in a few jurisdictions, such as 
Maine, there is no publicly-funded pretrial services agency.108
Despite this multiplicity of sources, however, the fundamental power to 
prescribe bail practices lies in the legislature.  But when the legislature delegates the 
responsibility and discretion for the practice of bail—as they all have done, largely 
to the judiciary—agency problems inevitably arise.
B. Rules, Standards, and the Principal-Agent Problem in Bail
The typical American bail system can be conceptualized as a principal-agent 
relationship.109 The legislature (as the voice of the public) is the principal, and 
attempts to express through statute its desire for a particular balance between, say, 
the presumption of innocence and the community’s need for protection from 
unconvicted but potentially dangerous individuals.  Judges, in turn, are the agents 
tasked with effectuating the legislature’s statutorily-expressed preference.110 As in 
any agency relationship, there is an inherent tension between the parties’ incentives.  
Judges are “wary of bearing public responsibility” for releasing a defendant who 
commits a new crime while on pretrial release, but at the same time, “judges do not 
internalize any of the costs of pretrial detention”—such as the costs of operating jails 
and the lost tax revenue and strains on social services resulting from unnecessary 
detention—“nor do they receive awards for correctly releasing defendants 
pretrial.”111 These misaligned incentives come to bear regardless of the source of 
the judge’s risk analysis.  Judges’ wariness of incurring blame is likely to be affected 
by news stories and other publicity surrounding any high-profile “failure” of a risk 
assessment model, such as the July 2017 murder, in San Francisco, of Edward 
French.  French was killed by a man who had been arrested and released only days 
earlier, after a judge received an erroneous risk assessment score.112 The incident 
led to increased criticism of the risk assessment tool used in the case; NPR’s headline 
for the story was, after all, the tendentious “Did A Bail Reform Algorithm Contribute 
                                                                                                     
107. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 9.1-100, 19.2-152.2 (2014) (enabling counties and cities to 
establish pretrial services agencies, overseen by the Department of Criminal Justice Services, an 
executive agency with a director appointed by the governor).
108. Maine does have an effective, private, nonprofit pretrial services agency, but its capacity is 
limited by its budget. See infra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
109. See Wiseman, supra note 8, at 422 n.22 (clarifying that the public is the true principal, 
operating through the legislature).
110. See id. at 422.
111. Id. at 422-23; cf. Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 723-24 
(2005) (examining institutional design, performance, and dynamics of administrative agencies in 
criminal justice). 
112. See generally Westervelt, supra note 91.  A related version of political “blamesmanship” has an 
infamous example in the 1988 “Willie Horton ad,” which blamed Democratic presidential candidate 
Michael Dukakis for the violent crimes committed by a prison inmate, William Horton, while Horton 
was on a temporary furlough.  As governor of Massachusetts, Dukakis had supported the furlough 
program, for which his political opponents excoriated him.  Bruce Porter, So What? Pulitzer Prize 
Winning Exposés and Their Sometimes Dubious Consequences, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Apr. 1995), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20080328003243/http://backissues.cjrarchives.org/year/95/2/pulitzers.asp 
[https://perma.cc/6EC8-LYVL]. 
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To This San Francisco Man’s Murder?”113 For all of these reasons, the principal-
agent problem in the bail system is stark, even (perhaps especially) when judges are 
provided with actuarial risk assessment results.
A rule/standard analysis can be useful in addressing the principal-agent 
problem.114 (A standard is a directive to, e.g., “protect public safety” or “minimize 
unnecessary detention”; a rule is a direction that a judge “unconditionally release any 
defendant with a PSA score below 2.”)  Most bail codes in the U.S., including 
Maine’s, are standard-based: for example, the 1984 federal Bail Reform Act directs 
judges to release defendants unless release “will not reasonably assure the 
appearance of the person as required or will endanger the safety of any other person 
or the community.”115 But a rule-based system—a “classic means of reducing certain 
agency costs” by eliminating judicial discretion116—may be preferable in the bail 
context, given the more limited, and more readily quantifiable, goals of pretrial 
practice compared to sentencing.
1. The Wiseman Proposal
Professor Samuel Wiseman proposes a system in which state bail 
commissions—likely a governor-appointed panel subject to legislative oversight—
would set mandatory bail guidelines to be set by bail commissions in each state.117
Judges would be required to release (with or without conditions) or detain defendants 
based solely on the guidelines, which would be set by the commission’s 
determination of acceptable flight and dangerousness risk levels.118 Departure from 
the guidelines would only be permitted under very limited circumstances (Wiseman 
suggests that a prosecutorial showing of clear and convincing evidence might 
suffice).119
Going further, Crystal Yang suggests that jurisdictions incorporate the costs and 
benefits of pretrial detention directly into “net-benefit assessment tools” that would 
calculate the specific and quantifiable costs of pretrial detention (such as effects on 
income and housing, as well as increased jail costs) and balance them against the 
quantifiable benefits (decreased crime).120 While Yang declines to propose a 
particular procedure for implementing this cost-benefit analysis—her paper merely 
aims to clarify what we should mean when we talk about “risk assessment”—her 
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reliance on “data-driven algorithm[s]” does suggest a rule-based, rather than 
standard-based, model.121
i. Rules and Standards in Pretrial Practice
A rule-based system would have substantial benefits.  Primarily, it would better 
preserve and restore control of the pretrial cost-benefit balance to the legislature by 
subjecting the commissions to tighter legislative control compared to judges.122 The 
commissions could also more readily admit community participation in some form, 
perhaps in the form of open commission proceedings or meetings, as in other local 
governance issues; the community, after all, is the purported beneficiary of pretrial 
detention.123 Furthermore, although causality might flow in either direction, 
adoption of a rule-based system would more or less require the adoption of actuarial 
risk assessments—the rules would need to be based on something quantifiable or 
definitive, and judicial assessments would not fit that bill.
Ad hoc judicial application of actuarial tools also suggests that a rule-based 
system would better effectuate the tools’ proponents’ intent.  A judge is most likely 
to override the risk assessment’s recommendation when her clinical assessment (how 
she views the defendant) is furthest from the risk assessment’s recommendation.  In 
other words, if one of the main objections to pretrial risk assessment is that it doesn’t 
really do anything (because most of the time, judges’ clinical assessments are already 
fairly accurate), then it is precisely when the risk assessment runs most contrary to 
judicial assessments that it is most important to force judges to abide by it.  Under a 
rule-based system, even if most risk assessment recommendations will seem to a 
judge like irresponsible legislative overreach à la the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 
it is precisely when a judge disagrees with the recommendation that it should be most 
difficult to override a score.
Furthermore, research suggests that when humans receive “bad” advice from an 
algorithmic advisor, they abandon the algorithm at a much greater rate than they do 
an errant human advisor.124 Thus, under a standard-based system, a judge who 
follows the actuarial tool’s recommendation and releases a defendant only to see 
them miss court dates, violate bail conditions, or otherwise “fail” to live up to the 
algorithm’s promise125 will be much more reluctant to follow the algorithm’s 
recommendation in the future—and given the sheer number of cases that judges 
oversee, such failures will not be once-in-a-blue-moon occurrences.  This danger is 
heightened by confirmation bias.  If a judge is skeptical of actuarial tools, they will 
                                                                                                     
121. See id. at 1490.
122. See Barkow, supra note 111, at 732.
123. See Appleman, supra note 23, at 1357-58.
124. Andrew Prahl & Lyn Van Swol, Understanding Algorithm Aversion: When Is Advice from 
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see, statistical data on the risk assessment’s aggregate outcomes.
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be more likely to notice, and place greater narrative weight on, cases where the 
algorithm “fails” than where it succeeds.
There are, of course, drawbacks to the promulgation of rules rather than 
standards in pretrial practice.  For one thing, some problems within traditional bail 
systems arise from half-baked legislative attempts to preclude judicial leniency 
through rules.  For instance, in Maine as in many states, the violation of a condition 
of pretrial release (“VCR”)—e.g., that the defendant not use or possess alcohol—is 
a strict liability offense.126 In a sense, this statute codifies a legislative “risk 
assessment.”  And the presence of any VCR, no matter how innocuous or explicable, 
on a defendant’s record is a factor in the setting of their bail.127 This rule is crude,
vastly over- and under-inclusive, and exemplifies the extent to which the current 
system of judicial assessment is unsuited for tighter legislative control.  The system 
needs reordering, not just jerry-rigging.
ii. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines’ Long Shadow
The state bail commissions proposed by Wiseman naturally raise the specter of 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which have been widely criticized, particularly 
prior to Booker, which made them merely advisory.128 Much of this criticism is 
inapplicable to the pretrial context, however, and even more diminished when 
guidelines are applied through actuarial tools, rather than through the Guidelines’ 
inquisitorial, but still fundamentally clinical, administration.
First, to the extent that pretrial detention is regulatory, not punitive, a rule-based 
system would not implicate Sixth Amendment issues.  Granting that pretrial 
detention has punitive characteristics (which is, after all, one of the reasons its use 
should be minimized), the use of actuarial tools allows the government to much more 
narrowly tailor detention to its interest in public safety and defendant reappearance.  
One of the major problems with the Sentencing Guidelines is that sentencing 
justifications and goals—retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation—are diverse and 
largely moral, which makes statistical analysis an exercise in rationalization (or 
worse). On the other hand, pretrial detention’s goals—ensuring the defendant’s 
reappearance and preventing recidivism—are quantifiable, discrete, and relatively 
objective.129
Besides constitutional issues, however, some problems remain.  First, the 
Sentencing Guidelines have been criticized for replacing an adversarial sentencing 
process with a de facto inquisitorial system.130 Under the Guidelines, “[i]t became 
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the judge, not the jury, who determined the upper limits of sentencing, and the facts 
determined were not required to be . . . proved by more than a preponderance.”131 In
Booker, of course, that portion of the statute making adherence to the Guidelines 
mandatory was found to offend the Sixth Amendment.132 But even under Booker,
the Guidelines—administered through this inquisitorial process—remain available 
to sentencing judges as “advisory provisions.”133
Should a mandatory bail guideline survive these criticisms?  In the pretrial 
context, the judge already carries out the administrative function of the state—judges 
are already called on to make non-arbitral decisions on bail.134 A judge would not 
be abrogating her duty to the adversarial system because the pretrial setting is a de 
facto inquisitorial system already.135
Second, the Sentencing Commission’s recommendations were subject to fairly 
strict legislative oversight.  A deadlocked legislature might find it very difficult to 
successfully oversee a bail commission, and as Wiseman and others point out, the 
political pressure to limit pretrial detention for budgetary reasons will “wane in times 
of economic plenty.”136 Even worse than the legislature’s ignoring a bail 
commission, though, may be its capture by groups with a strong interest in higher 
rates of pretrial detention.  This is no new pattern.  The coalitions with the strongest 
interest in preventing unnecessary detention—an interest based less on ideology and 
more on material impact—tend to be dispersed, disorganized, and politically 
marginalized; but political bodies, whether legislative or administrative, tend to be 
more responsive to better-organized (and -funded) ideological groups.137 The 
Sentencing Commission arguably dodged that pitfall, but it fell prey to another 
medium for special interest groups: Congress itself.  Legislative interventions in the 
Sentencing Commission’s work were disruptive, such as Congress’s infamous 
rejection of the Commission’s 1995 and 1997 proposals to reduce the famous 100:1 
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disparity between crack and powder cocaine offenses.138 The lobbying danger is 
real, but can be mitigated by procedural requirements, including the presence of 
community members on bail commissions, or community bail funds.139
Third, the Sentencing Guidelines were costly and onerous to apply.  The 
Sentencing Manual is long, complex, and—even in 2018—essentially a manual 
process.140 By contrast, an algorithmic bail recommendation would be far easier to 
administer (by necessity, to meet the time limits of the pretrial process).  And while 
the Sentencing Guidelines were not intended to reduce detention costs (they did just 
the opposite, by nearly all accounts), a bail guideline could be calibrated to account 
for detention costs141—indeed, the conventional political argument for actuarial risk 
assessment tools is that they allow for greater release rates without substantially 
increasing the risk of FTAs or rearrests.142
C.  The New Jersey Approach
The most prominent and comprehensive example of pretrial justice reform thus 
far is New Jersey’s Criminal Justice Reform Law, which took effect in January 
2017.143 New Jersey’s is the first statewide, comprehensive, de facto elimination of 
money bail (although it does retain the possibility of money bail in certain 
circumstances).144 The goals of the New Jersey reforms are in line with the 
mainstream bail reform movement: to reduce pretrial jail populations, eliminate 
racial or other unfair disparities in bail decisions, and mitigate injustices of bail 
schedules, such as detaining poor defendants due solely to their inability to pay what 
would be, for many people, a nominal amount.
The New Jersey system operates essentially as follows: upon arrest, a defendant 
is assessed with the Arnold Public Safety Assessment (PSA), a risk assessment tool 
developed by the Arnold Foundation, a nonprofit institution that (among other 
things) provides financial and organizational support to criminal justice reform 
initiatives.145 The defendant must be arraigned within forty-eight hours, at which
point, unless the prosecutor files a motion for pretrial detention, the judge will order 
                                                                                                     
138. Jelani Jefferson Exum, Forget Sentencing Equality: Moving From the “Cracked” Cocaine 
Debate Toward Particular Purpose Sentencing, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 95, 106 (2014).
139. See Simonson, supra note 35, at 630-31. 
140. See generally U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2016).  An 
“app” is available at https://guidelines.ussc.gov, but it does little to automate or speed up the process.
141. See Yang, supra note 120, at 1419.
142. See Wiseman, supra note 8, at 477-78.
143. N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:162-15 (2018).
144. Joel Rose, New Jersey Banking on Shift from Bail Money to Risk Assessment, NPR (Dec. 27, 
2016), https://www.npr.org/2016/12/27/507049538/new-jersey-banking-on-shift-from-bail-money-to-
risk-assessment [https://perma.cc/L3EJ-WK8V].  The New Jersey reform does not completely eliminate 
money bail, but reserves it as a last resort, to be used only in cases of pretrial release where non-
monetary conditions are deemed insufficient to ensure public safety and the defendant’s appearance. See 
GLENN A. GRANT, N.J. JUDICIARY, CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM ANNUAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR 
AND LEGISLATURE 1, 1 (2016), 
https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/courts/assets/criminal/2016cjrannual.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PEJ-
PS5C].
145. N.J. CT. R. 3:3-1(d); see also GRANT, supra note 144, at 3.
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them released on “either personal recognizance, the execution of an unsecured 
appearance bond, or the least restrictive non-monetary conditions” sufficient to 
ensure reappearance and community safety.146 If the prosecutor does file a motion 
for pretrial detention, a hearing must be held, and the prosecutor must overcome, by 
clear and convincing evidence, a presumption in favor of pretrial release (except for 
charges of murder and other serious crimes).147 The risk assessment’s 
recommendation is, prima facie, sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption.148
The New Jersey risk assessment instrument has two components, which political 
and public discourse often conflate. First, a risk measurement component, the PSA, 
scores the defendant based on their risk factors, which are drawn automatically from 
state and national criminal history databases.149 Second, the risk management
component, the Decision Making Framework (DMF), “categorizes defendants into 
risk levels based upon the . . . factors considered and calculated by both the PSA and 
the severity of the current charge(s).”150 The DMF, which is calibrated and 
controlled by the administrative office of the New Jersey Judiciary, is the tool that 
actually “produces a recommendation for a judge about conditions of release or 
detention.”151 Because the DMF is not an actuarial assessment or measurement but 
rather a set of guidelines that merely incorporates an actuarial risk analysis, it can be 
tweaked or tailored by the judiciary to accomplish particular policy goals.152 For 
example, in response to complaints that people arrested on certain gun violations 
were being released too easily, the Pretrial Services Program considered altering the 
DMF.153
The presumption against pretrial detention is not toothless.  It carries, of course, 
the typical bottlenecks and procedural hurdles to limit prosecutorial or judicial 
discretion: prosecutors and judges have little incentive, for instance, to expend their 
limited time and labor resources on detaining defendants who have been classified 
as nondangerous.  As an additional safeguard, the New Jersey Attorney General has 
issued a directive requiring higher-ups to approve any pretrial detention motions in 
many cases.154
Early indications are that New Jersey’s reforms have succeeded in reducing 
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pretrial jail populations.  Between January 1 and November 30, 2017, the pretrial jail 
population in New Jersey declined by about 16% (and the January 1, 2017 snapshot 
may have been unrepresentative of the pre-reform baseline; between November 30, 
2015 and November 30, 2017, the pretrial jail population declined by 36%).155
Serious crime—homicide, rape, robbery, assault, and burglary—has also seen a very 
slight decline from 2016 (which does not necessarily mean that bail reform has 
reduced crime rates, but does contravene a common, if lazy, criticism of bail reform: 
that it will lead to a crime wave, as improvidently released defendants immediately 
reoffend).156 At only one year in, it is obviously premature to say that New Jersey’s 
reforms have accomplished their goals.  But it is clear that the coordinated efforts 
between New Jersey’s judiciary, legislature, executive,157 and public have created an 
institutional structure that gives evidence-based risk assessment a foundation for 
success.
1. ODARA in the New Jersey System
New Jersey’s bail statute specifically lists “any crime or offense involving 
domestic violence” as a crime for which prosecutors may seek pretrial detention 
without showing flight risk or dangerousness.158 However, the risk assessment tool 
on which the New Jersey system relies, the PSA, does not account for specific IPV 
risk factors.159 In 2016, while New Jersey was preparing to transition to the new 
system, the Arnold Foundation and the New Jersey Supreme Court Ad Hoc 
Committee on Domestic Violence both recommended that New Jersey adopt a 
complementary risk assessment “trailer tool” for IPV cases.160 In September 2017, 
Christopher Porrino, the New Jersey Attorney General, formally directed law 
enforcement agencies and prosecutors to begin using ODARA to assess risk in IPV 
cases, in conjunction with the PSA.161
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However, Porrino’s directive is somewhat at odds with the judiciary’s 
declaration that it is “not prepared to utilize the ODARA because it believes that 
legislative authorization . . . is necessary before judicial officers can consider 
ODARA scores.”162 For instance, prosecutors are directed to seek pretrial detention 
for cases in which the ODARA score is 5 or higher, unless a supervisory prosecutor 
overrides that presumption and documents their reasons for doing so.163 But the 
prosecution cannot disseminate the ODARA score to judges, so in cases where the 
judiciary’s DMF’s presumption (which does not incorporate ODARA) is at odds 
with the prosecutor’s presumption (based exclusively on ODARA), the prosecutor 
may not argue the motion using the ODARA score—but they may, and are 
encouraged to, argue the motion using “facts learned through administration of the 
ODARA.”164
This procedure, and the information asymmetry on which it stands, threatens to 
undermine the statutory power balance between prosecutors and the judiciary.  A 
judge may not know the ODARA score, but she can surely identify a pattern of 
prosecutors seeking detention in intimate partner violence cases.  And there is 
nothing to prevent a judge familiar with ODARA’s inputs from noticing that certain 
facts supporting the prosecutor’s pretrial-detention motion are, as luck would have 
it, facts that might be gleaned from an ODARA administration.
That said, the New Jersey judiciary’s concerns with ODARA incorporation are 
obscure to begin with, and could surely be mollified by a tweak of the risk assessment 
statute to allow, for instance, use a specialized risk assessment tool in certain 
specified cases.165 New Jersey’s ODARA implementation is in a state of flux; Maine 
should monitor New Jersey’s experience for guidance as to incorporating ODARA 
into a rule-based bail system.
D.  The Kentucky Approach
Kentucky has been using actuarial risk assessment in its pretrial practice for 
longer than most jurisdictions, dating back to 1976 and the formation of its pretrial 
services agency.166 In 2006, Kentucky adopted a modern, actuarial risk assessment 
instrument, “similar in many ways to other pretrial risk tools currently in use”;167
since 2013, it has used the Arnold PSA.168 Between 2000 and 2010, Kentucky’s total 
prison population exploded, which led to further reform efforts consolidated in a 
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2011 bill, HB 463.169 HB 463 requires judges: (1) to consider a defendant’s risk 
assessment score, along with several other factors,170 in determining whether they 
are a flight risk or are likely to be a danger to the public;171 (2) to release “low risk” 
defendants on their own recognizance or with an unsecured bond;172 and (3), 
similarly, to release “moderate risk” defendants, but with extra consideration of 
electronic monitoring or other increased supervision.173 The bill otherwise leaves 
judicial discretion untouched; per a Kentucky Supreme Court Order interpreting the 
statute, “[n]othing in these guidelines should be construed to limit the court’s 
discretion as to whether or not to grant pretrial release to a defendant.”174 In short, 
Kentucky’s is an utterly standard-based bail system; while progressive in its 
presumption in favor of pretrial release, its reservation of substantial judicial 
discretion could easily undermine the reform’s goals.
One forthcoming paper by Professor Megan Stevenson examines Kentucky’s 
use of the Arnold PSA by comparing pretrial release decisions (such as the amount 
of money bail and the imposition of non-financial conditions) before and after HB 
463 went into effect.175 Stevenson confirms some of Wiseman’s worst fears.  
Immediately after consideration of the risk assessment was made mandatory, there 
was a “sizeable decrease in bail for defendants who were ranked as low risk,”176
along with a commensurate increase in the percentage of defendants granted non-
financial release.177 So far, so good.  But Stevenson’s analysis also shows that HB 
463 also resulted in “a sharp drop in the fraction of defendants receiving low cash 
bail,”178 which “suggests that judges responded to the risk assessment changes . . . 
by substituting non-financial release for low-cash bail.”179 Furthermore, over time, 
“as judges returned to their previous bail setting habits,” the total release rate for all 
defendants settled down to a 4 percent increase180—hardly the budget-saving silver 
bullet for which risk assessment’s proponents might hope.  Though Stevenson 
doesn’t go so far, this decline over time may well stem from psychological responses 
to algorithmic tools’ “failures,” such as overcompensation for perceived 
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information provided by the risk assessment” is further supported by the fact that “there was no change 
in the release rate for defendants who did not receive a risk score due to [procedural difficulties].” Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. (manuscript at 39) (emphasis in original).
179. Id.
180. Id. (manuscript at 50).
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technological errors.181
Worse still, while Stevenson’s research basically suggests that HB 463 made 
judges more likely to consider the risk assessment score, there was also evidence of 
a slight increase in failure to appear (FTA) and pretrial rearrest rates.182 Assuming 
actuarial risk assessment is a better predictor of these events than judicial 
assessment—a premise Stevenson neither concedes nor denies—one would expect a 
decrease in FTA and rearrest rates if judges were actually following the actuarial 
scores.  Stevenson hypothesizes that this discrepancy may stem from judicial 
discretion being a one-way ratchet, “used not to correct the risk assessment when it 
erred, but to override the risk assessment when it was correct.”183 In other words, 
judges may accord the actuarial score weight when it confirms their own 
assessments, but devalue it when it conflicts with their hunch—that is, they are most 
likely to override the score at the very time its predictive gains are most important.  
I will explore this problem further in Part III, as it is a particular hurdle to the 
successful implementation of actuarial tools in the IPV context.
In sum, Kentucky’s experiment shows that pretrial risk assessment can 
marginally improve overall outcomes through a standard-based system, but that a 
system that does not meaningfully constrain judicial discretion may not realize the 
tools’ full potential.  Indeed, given judicial skepticism of actuarial tools, standards 
may even lead to worse predictive efficiency than traditional judicial risk assessment.
E. Maine’s Current Bail System
Maine’s bail code, 15 M.R.S.A. §§ 1001-1105, broadly conforms to the 1984 
Act’s mold.  It creates a presumption of pretrial release, either on personal 
recognizance or with an unsecured bond, but allows the judicial officer184 to impose 
cash bail and release conditions if she finds them necessary in order to: “ensure the 
appearance of the defendant” at trial; “ensure that the defendant would refrain from 
any new criminal conduct”; “ensure the integrity of the judicial process”; or “ensure 
the safety of others in the community.”185
Pretrial services agencies play a major role in most modern bail systems, but 
Maine has no publicly funded pretrial agency.  Instead, Maine Pretrial Services 
(MPS), a private nonprofit agency, largely fills this crucial gap.  Founded in 1983, 
MPS is a nonprofit dedicated to providing the least restrictive bail alternative—
typically in the form of pretrial community supervision—for those who cannot post 
bail or, in the judge’s eyes, require additional pretrial supervision.  (MPS is also 
dedicated to enacting reforms to eliminate cash bail.)  MPS conducts prearraignment 
screenings, along with a needs assessment, for any defendant who requests pretrial 
                                                                                                     
181. See Prahl & Van Swol, supra note 124 and accompanying text.
182. Stevenson, supra note 62 (manuscript at 50).
183. Id. (manuscript at 51).  Stevenson’s alternative theory—that the shift from low cash bail 
towards non-financial release “may have reduced the incentives for released defendants to show up in 
court,” thus resulting in the FTA increase—is certainly plausible, but does not comport as nicely with 
the judicial skepticism of risk assessment that she notes. Id. (manuscript at 52).
184. The definition of “judicial officer” includes bail commissioners. 15 M.R.S.A. § 1003(8) (2012).
185. Id. § 1026(2-A).
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services.  The MPS screening includes an actuarial risk assessment, but the 
defendant’s score is not shared with the court or the parties—the risk assessment 
score is used internally by MPS in determining whether or not to offer pretrial 
supervision.186
A judge setting bail may modify a defendant’s bail based on MPS’s willingness 
to supervise them.  Not infrequently, a judge will offer a defendant a choice: a lower 
cash bail with MPS supervision, or higher cash bail without supervision.187 This 
indicates that Maine judges view MPS as an insurance policy rather than as a risk 
assessor.
Additionally, judges and bail commissioners seem to vary in their reliance on 
the community safety provision.188 The 1980 Commission noted that “judges and 
bail commissioners sometimes practice preventive detention, sub rosa or informally, 
by setting unreachably high bail,” and recommended amending the Maine 
Constitution to “[eliminate] the need for this fiction” by allowing for detention 
without bail if the defendant “is an unreasonable risk of danger to the community or 
the judicial process.”189
While some of the problems with excess pretrial detention most frequently cited 
in other jurisdictions—overcrowded jails, burdens on state and local budgets, and 
the like—are not as severe in Maine, they are present and do have budgetary and 
human impacts.190 In short, the issues that are driving other states to change their 
pretrial practices are causing harm in Maine as well.191
1. Prospects for Reform
The subject of bail reform has arisen intermittently in Maine.  In 2015, an 
Intergovernmental Task Force issued a report recommending various reforms, 
including an in-depth study into expanding actuarial risk assessment use and 
eliminating (or vastly reducing) cash bail.192 Despite repeated calls for reform, most 
prominently from Chief Justice Saufley,193 no legislative action has been taken.  
                                                                                                     
186. Email from Shawn LaGrega, Dep. Dir., Maine Pretrial Services, to author (Nov. 9, 2017) (on 
file with author).  MPS uses the Virginia tool, rather than the Arnold PSA. Id.
187. This use of MPS is so common that the Maine bail bond paperwork—the form filled out by a 
judge setting bail—includes it as a check-the-box option.
188. MARIE VANNOSTRAND ET AL., LUMINOSITY INC., PRETRIAL CASE PROCESSING IN MAINE 20
(2006), https://digitalmaine.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1031&context=doc_docs 
[https://perma.cc/NY3T-VD7E].
189. JAMES E. TIERNEY ET AL., REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION TO STUDY THE LAWS 
RELATING TO BAIL IN CRIMINAL CASES 11-12 (Dec. 1983).
190. See Eric Russell, Legislation Seeks to Eliminate Setting of Bail for Maine Defendants,
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD Feb. 9, 2015, https://www.pressherald.com/2015/02/09/legislation-seeks-to-
eliminate-setting-of-bail-for-maine-defendants [https://perma.cc/Q737-UYM9].
191. See ROBERT E. MULLEN ET AL., REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PRETRIAL JUSTICE 
REFORM TASK FORCE 9-11 (2015), 
http://www.courts.maine.gov/reports_pubs/reports/pdf/PTJRTF_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3BX-
UKL9].
192. See id. at 28-30; see also Russell, supra note 190.
193. See Hon. Leigh I. Saufley, Me. Jud. Branch, The State of the Judiciary: A Report to the Joint 
Convention of the Second Regular Session of the 127th Legislature 6 (March 9, 2016), 
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While Maine has one of the lowest violent crime and incarceration rates in the nation, 
pretrial incarceration has been steadily increasing for years—in 2014, the pretrial 
population of a majority of Maine’s county jails exceeded 70% of the total inmate 
population.194 This has led to several jails exceeding capacity, which, according to 
the 2015 report, “creates complex financial, personnel, programming and personal 
problems for the Sheriffs, the Court system . . . and the individual defendants and 
their families.”195
Speculation on the likelihood of political activity is beyond the scope of this 
article, but it is notable that over the last two decades, Maine has not shied away 
from enacting other criminal justice-related reforms, such as marijuana 
legalization.196 And some barriers to bail reform that exist elsewhere, such as the 
bail bond industry and its all-or-nothing lobbying strategy (bail reform would likely 
end the industry), are minimally relevant or nonexistent in Maine.197
On the other hand, while in many other states bail reform is sold largely on 
budgetary grounds, the biggest hurdle to bail reform in Maine may be, ironically, the 
potential financial implications.  While Maine’s per-inmate operating cost is large,198
its total size is small enough that the economies of scale driving pretrial reforms 
elsewhere may not be achievable.  As a purely financial matter, the costs of bail 
reform in Maine may outweigh the benefits: the most recent bail reform proposal in 
Maine is estimated to cost an additional “$4 to 5 million a year.”199 Additionally, 
some prosecutorial budgets rely on bail forfeiture—such as the substantial sums 
often forfeited by out-of-state defendants—to fund other costs, such as extradition.200
Were money bail to end, these forfeitures would also dry up, with no ready 
replacement since the savings on pretrial detention, substantial as they may be, would 
be dispersed more broadly.  These barriers are by no means insuperable—as 
impediments to bail reform go, we are lucky to have them—but they will require 
extra political will.  The most recent legislative attempt at some sort of limited bail 
reform was substantially amended, and the breadth of its reforms commensurately 
                                                                                                     
http://www.courts.maine.gov/maine_courts/supreme/speeches/SoJ%202016.pdf [https://perma.cc/QF68-
R7MR].
194. MULLEN ET AL., supra note 191, at 3 n.1.
195. Id. at 9.
196. Scott Thistle, Maine House Upholds LePage’s Veto of Recreational Marijuana Regulations,
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.pressherald.com/2017/11/06/legislature-set-to-
take-up-lepage-veto-of-recreational-marijuana [https://perma.cc/5SUF-U7NS].
197. MULLEN ET AL., supra note 191, at 19.
198. See JAMES J. STEPHAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, STATE PRISON EXPENDITURES, 2001, 
at 3 tbl. 2 (June 2004), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/spe01.pdf [https://perma.cc/3SMV-ETNW] 
(calculating Maine’s jail operating costs per inmate, as of FY2001, at $44,379, compared to a national 
average of $22,650).
199. Leigh I. Saufley, Me. Jud. Branch, The State of the Judiciary: A Report to the Joint Convention 
of the First Regular Session of the 128th Legislature 7 (Feb. 26, 2017), 
http://www.courts.maine.gov/maine_courts/supreme/speeches/2017_soj.pdf [https://perma.cc/KE77-
CRN9].
200. Interview with Maeghan Maloney, District Att’y, Kennebec Cty., in Augusta, Me. (Aug. 10, 
2017) (on file with author).
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reduced, in committee.201 Without significant additional pressure, whether from the 
court system, the legislature, or the people, serious bail reform may not come to pass.
IV. ODARA IN MAINE
In 2004, researchers at the Mental Health Centre Penetanguishene, responding 
to a call by the Ontario government for intimate partner violence research, developed 
the Ontario Domestic Assault Risk Assessment (ODARA).202 ODARA is an 
actuarial risk assessment tool for predicting IPV recidivism based on data available 
to police officers at the scene of an assault.203 To develop ODARA, the researchers 
studied and coded 1,400 IPV arrests in Ontario, selecting predictors that significantly 
correlated to recidivism, and retaining “only those that made a significant 
independent contribution to the total sample.”204
The result of this work is a 13-point test that can be administered by police at or 
shortly after leaving the scene of an IPV crime.  Each question is scored as either 1 
or 0,205 and a viable score can be reached with up to five questions unanswered; the 
scorer keeps track of the number of missing items and uses a table to turn the raw 
score into the final score.  Scores within the ranges 5-6 and 7-13 are treated as the 
same.206 A final ODARA score ranges from 0 (which indicates a 7% chance of 
recidivism within 5 years) to 13 (a 77% chance of recidivism), with most scores 
falling between 1 and 6.207
An ODARA score is based exclusively on information that should be available 
to officers at the scene of an assault.  Five of the inputs are based on an arrestee’s 
criminal history, such as prior assaults and jail time.  Most of the rest are based on 
circumstances at the scene, such as the presence of children or alcohol; the victim’s 
fear of the assailant (based on an interview); and barriers to victim support, such as 
lack of reliable transportation or communication.  ODARA has been used by 
Canadian courts since 2004, beginning with experiments in Ontario bail courts in 
2004.
                                                                                                     
201. The most pertinent amendments removed provisions (A) requiring that “the Judicial Branch pay 
all bail commissioner fees” and (B) eliminating the use of unsecured appearance bonds. Comm. Amend. 
to L.D. 1639 (127th Legis. 2016), 
http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/display_ps.asp?LD=1639&snum=127 
[https://perma.cc/K4SF-55K9].  These provisions were opposed by the Aroostook County DA, among 
others.  An Act to Implement the Recommendations of the Intergovernmental Pretrail Justice Reform 
Task Force: Hearing on L.D. 1639 Before the J. Standing Comm. on Judiciary, 127th Legis., 2nd Reg. 
Sess. (Mar. 14, 2016) (testimony of Todd Collins, District Att’y, Aroostook Cty).
202. HILTON ET AL., supra note 9, at 4.
203. Most other IPV risk assessment tools use predictors unavailable to police, such as “early 
childhood problems, psychopathic characteristics, [and] criminal behavior before the age of 16.”  Id. at 
10.
204. Id. at 51-52, 56.  The researchers used police records to account for “all domestic incidents,” 
and thereby avoid the issue of police or prosecutors ceasing to pursue a charge. Id.
205. ODARA’s creators found that the predictive benefits of weighted scores were minimal, 
especially when compared to the ease of use of the “1 or 0” test. Id. at 56-57.
206. Id. at 60 (explaining that the small number of cases in these ranges made individual score 
assessments distinguishing between scores of 5 and 6 or between 9 and 11 unreliable).
207. Id. at app. B, tbl. B.1.
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A. ODARA Adoption
In 2011, after a string of high-profile intimate partner homicides, the Maine 
Commission on Domestic and Sexual Abuse formed a task force to study risk 
assessment practices in IPV cases.208 In December 2011, while the task force 
worked, Representative Emily Cain of Orono introduced a bill to mandate use of 
evidence-based risk assessment in Maine’s criminal justice system.209 Following 
extensive research the task force recommended in its final report in February 2012 
the use of ODARA in Maine’s criminal justice system.210
The bill, L.D. 1711, passed the legislature with minimal amendment211 and was 
signed into law by Governor LePage on May 21, 2012.212 When the law went into 
effect in January 2015, Maine became the first state to require, statewide, the use of 
evidence-based risk assessment in IPV cases.213
L.D. 1711 implemented ODARA through several statutory requirements.  First, 
law enforcement officers must administer an ODARA test whenever they have 
reason to believe that IPV has occurred.214 Second, law enforcement agencies must 
adopt written policies and procedures that provide for ODARA’s administration in 
IPV cases.215 Third, the statute requires bail commissioners to make a “good faith 
effort to obtain” an ODARA score before setting bail in an IPV case.216 Fourth, the 
law requires a judge to “consider” a defendant’s ODARA score in setting bail.217
The act took effect on January 1, 2015, to allow law enforcement agencies enough 
                                                                                                     
208. MAINE DOMESTIC ABUSE HOMICIDE REVIEW PANEL, WORKING TOGETHER TO END DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE 14 (2012), 
http://www.maine.gov/ag/dynld/documents/Working_Together_to_End_Domestic_Violence_04-11-
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209. An Act to Mandate the Use of Standardized Risk Assessment in the Management of Domestic 
Violence Crimes: Hearing on L.D. 1711 Before the J. Standing Comm. on Crim. Just. and Pub. Safety,
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ASSESSMENT COMMITTEE REPORT 3 (2012), 
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212. L.D. 1711 (125th Legis. 2012), 
http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/display_ps.asp?PID=0&snum=125&paper=&paperld=l&ld=
1711 [https://perma.cc/P6A9-4AVK].
213. Samantha Edwards, Maine’s New Domestic Violence Protocol Goes into Effect,
NEWSCENTERMAINE.COM (Jan. 2, 2015), http://www.newscentermaine.com/article/news/local/maines-
new-domestic-violence-protocol-goes-into-effect/311637995 [https://perma.cc/2SJT-DKTG].
214. 19-A M.R.S.A. § 4012(6) (2012).
215. 25 M.R.S.A. § 2803-B(1)(D)(5), (2)-(3) (2012).  Subsections (2) and (3) were later repealed in 
a stylistic revision of the entire chapter.
216. 15 M.R.S.A. §1023(4)(C)(6) (2012). Bail commissioners cannot set bail in an IPV case being 
charged as Class C or higher. Id.
217. Id. §1026(4)(C)(9-A).
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time to implement ODARA procedures.218
A sister statute, L.D. 1867, was enacted several weeks earlier.219 L.D. 1867 
made two pertinent changes to Maine’s bail procedure: first, it prohibits bail 
commissioners from setting bail in all Class A, B, and C domestic violence cases 
(i.e., felony domestic violence assault);220 and second, when a defendant violates bail 
conditions on an underlying IPV offense, L.D. 1867 requires that a judge make 
findings on the record before releasing the defendant.221
B. ODARA Implementation
Before L.D. 1711 passed, two agencies in Maine were systematically using 
ODARA: Saco Police and Maine Pretrial Services.222 In the two-plus years between 
the bill’s passing and its effective date, the Maine Criminal Justice Academy (MCJA) 
partnered with the Maine Coalition to End Domestic Violence (MCEDV) and the 
Violence Intervention Partnership of Cumberland County to develop ODARA 
policies and training.  In 2014, the MCJA’s revised training protocols for in-service 
officers included two hours of mandatory ODARA training.223 MCEDV also 
collaborated with the Maine Chiefs of Police to create and facilitate online training 
in ODARA procedures.224
There are some valid concerns about police administration of ODARA. In at 
least some of the 2016 IPV-related homicides, not only had an ODARA score not 
been provided to the judge setting bail, but a criminal records check had not even 
been run.225 (While responsibility for the former problem does not necessarily lie 
with police, if no criminal history is run, ODARA is impossible to administer.)  
Vesting the responsibility for ODARA administration within specific law 
                                                                                                     
218. An Act to Mandate the Use of Standardized Risk Assessment in the Management of Domestic 
Violence Crimes: Hearing on L.D. 1711 Before the J. Standing Comm. on Crim. Just. and Pub. Safety,
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221. Id. §§ 1095(2), 1097(2-A). This provision essentially creates a presumption of detention in 
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225. Saufley, supra note 199, at 10.
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enforcement units would ease these concerns, and several jurisdictions in Maine do 
have specialized IPV units or investigators.226 However, dedicated IPV units “are 
uncommon and may have insecure funding.”227
Furthermore, actuarial risk assessments are unworkable without accurate scores. 
Some of the ODARA inputs come from the defendant’s criminal history and are 
therefore easier to administer (and to double-check), but other inputs depend upon a 
victim interview and the police officer’s subjective assessment of, for instance, 
whether there were “indicators of substance abuse” or “confinement at the scene of 
the assault.”228 While the answers to these questions will generally be clear, and 
ODARA scoring forms include examples and clear guidance to alleviate problems 
of subjectivity, there are plenty of situations in which the answer is unclear.  In these 
cases, a score difference of only a point or two may substantially change the 
predicted recidivism risk.  Police may be mildly incentivized to score harshly for the 
same reasons that police sometimes manipulate crime statistics.229
While L.D. 1711 provided standards for law enforcement training, training of 
prosecutors, judges, and defense counsel has been more limited.  The 2015 Maine 
State Bar Association Annual Conference included one CLE session specifically on 
ODARA,230 and the judiciary provided its own internal training for judges.  
Otherwise, though, there seems to have been little systematic training or education 
for lawyers in the criminal justice system.231 In the defense bar, the eligibility 
requirements for defense attorneys to represent indigent criminal defendants require 
CLE credits on IPV defense but do not otherwise require any specific ODARA or 
risk assessment training or experience.  Nor do the Standards of Practice for indigent
                                                                                                     
226. See, e.g., Criminal Investigations Division (Detectives), CITY OF BANGOR, ME. (last visited 
Nov. 15, 2018), http://www.bangormaine.gov/content/318/354/1142/1188.aspx [https://perma.cc/HSX4-
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191, 212-16 (2008).
230. ME. STATE BAR ASS’N, 2015 MSBA ANNUAL MEETING PROGRAM (2015), 
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231. Prosecutor training was each jurisdiction’s responsibility. Interview with Maeghan Maloney, 
District Att’y, Kennebec Cty., in Augusta, Me. (Aug. 10, 2017).
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criminal defense attorneys make any mention of pretrial risk assessment.232
This is not to say that plenty of attorneys did not educate themselves; in an 
adversarial system that relies upon attorneys’ initiative and intuition to shape the law, 
that is what attorneys do.  But as Kentucky’s and New Jersey’s experiences indicate, 
risk assessment tools may be more effective within a rule-based system than within 
Maine’s standard-based system.
1. Comparing IPV and General Risk Assessment
Complicating analysis of ODARA’s implementation in Maine are the several 
important differences between risk assessment tools in the general criminal context 
and in IPV cases.  Maine is the first state to require a specialized IPV risk assessment 
tool in setting bail, but courts and agencies across the country have been using IPV 
risk assessments on a more ad hoc basis in pretrial, sentencing, probation, and other 
case management situations for years.233 Generally, pretrial IPV risk assessment 
implementation mirrors that of general dangerousness and flight risk assessments: 
both scenarios involve a policy or rule requiring some actor—law enforcement or 
pretrial officers, prosecutors, or judges—to consider the assessment results “as one 
piece of information among many” in reaching a decision.234 According to 
ODARA’s developers, several important factors affect the success of 
implementation, “including (a) careful specification of the desired outcome, (b) 
precise and objectively stated policy, (c) cooperation and coordination among 
agencies implementing and enforcing the policy,” as well as sufficient training and 
evaluative methods.235 Maine’s pretrial system must account for the important 
differences between the two tools’ uses, concerns, and effects.
First, in IPV cases, judges are balancing the defendant’s right not to be 
unnecessarily detained—and all the concomitant injuries detention entails—against 
the victim’s safety and freedom from harm.  IPV recidivism typically, though not 
always, occurs against the same victim.236 Essentially, the question is: how likely is 
the defendant to hurt the same victim and what conditions and supervision can most 
effectively reduce or eliminate that risk?
By contrast, general risk assessments balance the defendant’s right to not be 
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235. HILTON ET AL., supra note 9, at 121.
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unnecessarily detained against both “public safety” and flight risk.237 The “public 
safety” factor is generally understood to mean the odds that a defendant “pose[s] a 
risk of committing any crime on release; the label is not limited to those who may 
commit violent or dangerous crimes.”238 For most crimes, even most violent crimes, 
recidivism against the same victim is rare.239 Consequently, the statutory factors 
guiding risk assessment for non-IPV defendants do not address or consider the victim
at all, the assumption being that the defendant is no more likely to harm the victim 
than to harm any other person in the community.
Second, IPV risk assessment relies on a different set of factors.  While general 
criminal risk assessment tools inquire broadly into an individual defendant’s 
likelihood of committing any future crime or FTA (by looking at a defendant’s 
economic and personal history),240 ODARA’s inquiry is much more narrowly 
focused on the relationship between the defendant and the victim, and therefore 
incorporates more information about the alleged crime and the circumstances 
surrounding its commission.  For this reason, ODARA requires administration by 
police, and therefore changes to police procedure;241 by contrast, general risk 
assessments can typically be conducted by other actors, usually pretrial officers, or 
run automatically based on information available through state criminal histories.  
Maine Pretrial Services, for instance, administers a general risk assessment tool in 
Maine, whereas law enforcement officers must administer ODARA.242 Changes to 
police procedure can be expensive and impractical, may have unintended 
consequences, and can be resisted by police themselves.243 On the other hand, while 
scoring errors or incompleteness will be less common in PSA application than they 
are in ODARA application, other risks are present in automated systems: errors in 
the criminal history data itself, cases of mistaken identity, and the like.244 These 
                                                                                                     
237. GOULDIN, supra note 92, at 892 (noting that many risk assessment tools combine the risks of a 
defendant committing crimes on release, and failing to appear, into a single “pretrial failure” rate).
238. Id. at 851 (discussing federal courts’ interpretations of the 1984 Bail Reform Act).
239. According to a 2017 BJS report, between 2005 and 2014, “[v]ictims of violence committed by 
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243. See LAWRENCE SHERMAN, POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 109, 113 (1992).
244. For instance, a data entry error likely led to the pretrial release of Lamonte Mims in July 2017, 
five days before he allegedly murdered Edward French. Westervelt, supra note 91.  While risk 
assessment would not increase the likelihood of such errors, it may make their effects more pernicious, 
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errors are less easily overridden under a rule-based system than when police, 
prosecutors, and judges retain a greater degree of discretion.
Third, ODARA can help minimize the pretrial detention of “victim arrestees” –
that is, people (mostly women) who are arrested for IPV but are not the primary 
aggressors in the relationship.  There is evidence that a “substantial percentage of 
women [arrested for IPV], but not men, [have] been victimized by their partners and 
may have been acting in self-defense.”245 A 2004 California study of victim arrests 
noted that although women arrested for IPV were less likely than men to have been 
the “primary perpetrators” of the violence, they were just as likely to have used 
“severe violence and inflicted severe injuries” against their partners.246 Before 
ODARA’s adoption in Maine, judges, guided by the factors in Maine’s bail code, 
would use the severity of the alleged violence as a proxy for future dangerousness.247
The severity of the charged offense is always available to the arraigning judge, which 
may have led to disproportionately high bail for victim arrestees; ODARA, 
conversely, incorporates other evidence that an assault was retaliatory or defensive 
and thus aids in preventing that detention.248
Finally, ODARA was adopted in Maine explicitly as a way to identify and detain 
dangerous defendants rather than to identify and release harmless defendants.  Even 
the statute describes the ODARA score as “evidence that the defendant poses a 
danger to the safety of others in the community.”249 This language primes judges to 
view ODARA primarily as an indicator of dangerousness; by contrast, general risk 
assessment tools are largely implemented to indicate nondangerousness.250 Any 
implementation of general risk assessment in Maine must account for judges’ 
experiences with ODARA and its focus on heightened dangerousness.
Additionally, these distinctions become more important in rural places, where 
the dangerousness and lethality of intimate partner violence is greater than in urban 
areas.251 For most other crimes, there is a much narrower gap in rates between rural 
and urban areas.252 Therefore, in a predominately rural state like Maine,253 IPV risk 
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32, at 938-39.
249. 15 M.R.S.A. § 1026(4)(C)(9-A).
250. Starr, supra note 64, at 816.
251. Lisa B. Pruitt, Place Matters: Domestic Violence and Rural Difference, 23 WISC. J. L. GENDER,
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252. Id. at 348-49 & n.5.
253. In 2010, 61.3% of Mainers lived in rural areas.  Matt Wickenheiser, Census: Maine Most Rural 
State in 2010 as Urban Centers Grow Nationwide, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Mar. 26, 2012), 
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assessment does not only assist judges in making pretrial release and bail decisions, 
but also, perhaps even more importantly, to assist prosecutors, pretrial services, and 
victim services in allocating resources.254 Efficient resource allocation is an 
important benefit of risk assessment in general, but it is even more important in rural 
places where time and distance make pretrial supervision more difficult.
2.  Other Considerations
Certain normative and constitutional criticisms of actuarial risk assessment carry 
special weight in the IPV context.  Feminist critiques of mandatory arrest laws and 
the theory of state intervention as inevitably violent may become particularly salient 
when algorithms get involved.255 IPV risk assessment law must confront these 
issues.
Feminist writers and restorative justice advocates have criticized mandatory 
arrest laws on the grounds that they “revictimize” IPV victims by “[replicating] the 
very violence the state seeks to eradicate.”256 (The original impetus for mandatory 
arrest, in the 80s and 90s, was to eradicate the then-common police practice of 
minimizing or ignoring intimate partner violence, typically because it was viewed as 
a “private matter,” and thus fell outside law enforcement’s purview or 
responsibility.)257 Risk assessment’s robotic nature can increase the sense of 
disempowerment that many IPV victims feel in their interactions with the criminal 
justice system.258 This problem may even be heightened when, as with ODARA, 
facts about the victim (over which the victim has no control) underpin the state 
action.  That is, if general criminal risk assessment is impermissibly based on factors 
beyond the defendant’s control, then there is double the danger of impermissible bias 
in IPV cases because uncontrollable characteristics of both the defendant and the 
victim may affect the score.259
In Maine’s current system, IPV victims may attend their abuser’s bail hearings 
and argue for pretrial release.260 The reasons they do so are no less valid for their 
variety and complexity: economic dependence or vulnerability;261 the presence of 
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257. Kohn, supra note 229, at 212-15.
258. Mills, supra note 256, at 576-77.
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children; fear;262 love;263 fear of social stigma;264 and as many other reasons as there 
are people and personalities.  While these requests may be only rarely granted, the 
opportunity to be heard can show victims the human face behind the state action.  
The use of risk assessment would close this curtain and obscure state paternalism 
and violence in an aura of “objectivity.”265
Mandatory arrest, no-drop, and other laws and policies that subordinate 
“individual autonomy in domestic space to state control” may also raise Due Process 
issues.266 The privacy and marital autonomy rights developed in Griswold267 and its 
progeny268 are implicated whenever the state expands its reach into the home; no-
contact orders, curfews, electronic monitoring, and the like could be viewed as 
enforcing a “state-imposed de facto divorce.”269 Professor Jeannie Suk argues that 
expansion in the use of these state-imposed separation tools threatens to exceed their 
justification.  In other words, because IPV is a “manifestation of gendered power 
inequality” in intimate relationships, the law has developed extraordinary tools to 
deal with the problem, but these extraordinary tools are becoming normalized.270
However, the adoption of actuarial risk assessment in IPV cases will not increase 
this intrusion.  If anything, by more accurately predicting incidences of violence, it 
will help to reduce incidences of unwarranted separation.  Furthermore, the 
public/private distinction—as Professor Suk acknowledges—was historically used 
to justify non-intervention in IPV cases.271 Until the 1970s, it was common for 
police, prosecutors, and judges to treat IPV under a “therapeutic,” not criminal, 
framework, often on the grounds that the criminal justice system should not reach 
inside the home.272
If IPV risk assessment tools are to be used, we need not limit their outcomes to 
the relatively binary “release/no release” decision that characterizes rule-based 
systems.  Even if mandatory arrest and no-drop policies are inappropriate or 
counterproductive enactments of state violence, risk assessment should not be used 
mechanically in IPV cases.  Linda Mills has suggested that the state should allow 
some couples to enter alternative forms of counseling or healing, rather than 
universally prosecute IPV as a criminal matter, and that in many jurisdictions, 
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prosecution is mandated, in part, to avoid risk.273 These and other therapeutic uses 
of IPV risk assessment should be a part of any implementation scheme.
C.  Applying the Lessons of Risk Assessment Implementation
If and when Maine reforms its antiquated, problematic, and arguably 
unconstitutional bail system, how would actuarial tools be best incorporated into 
those reforms?  The theoretical appeal of a rule-based system is undeniable.  As
Wiseman persuasively argues and as Kentucky’s experience indicates, merely 
adopting an actuarial tool will not necessarily solve the problems inherent to a 
standard-based bail system.  Some curtailment of judicial discretion seems necessary 
if one’s goal is to reduce pretrial detention rates and to uncouple a defendant’s “risk 
level” (however it is determined: judicially or actuarially) from the amount of cash 
bail they must pay.  Judges may not trust actuarial tools and may be hasty to find 
reasons and ways to override their recommendations.274 This judicial skepticism, 
and reluctance to use actuarial tools, may compound itself.  A rule-based system 
seems to form a good baseline concept for actuarial risk assessment implementation.
Furthermore, Maine judges’ experience with ODARA may prime them to view 
risk assessment solely through a dangerousness lens.  Maintaining a standard-based 
procedure and simply attaching a general risk assessment could be risky because 
Maine judges have experience primarily with a risk assessment tool that indicates 
risk, rather than one that indicates the absence of risk.  This is no mere tautology: 
ODARA, through its history and the way it is taught, primes judges to look for risk, 
but the goal of the PSA and other bail reform models is to “reduce pretrial detention 
by limiting it to the statistically dangerous.”275
Actuarial tools are means, not ends.  We should not forget that a primary goal 
of actuarial risk assessment is the elimination of money bail or at least the mitigation 
of its worst harms.  While a standard-based system might lead to improved outcomes 
at the margins, the evidence from Kentucky indicates that without restricting judicial 
discretion these improvements are minimal (though they are no less real for being 
small: 100 defendants freed pretrial, who would otherwise have been detained, is a 
real, non-trivial gain in human welfare).  But if a rule-based system would lead to a 
greater increase in pretrial release—as New Jersey’s experience suggests it would—
then the gains from the actuarial tool would outweigh its drawbacks, most of which 
are present, to varying degrees, whether rules or standards are used.
Those drawbacks, of course, are the legitimacy and dignity concerns.  While 
these problems are heightened under a rule-based system, they attach to the very 
roots of the actuarial tool itself and are therefore still present if the actuarial tool is 
governed by a standard, not a rule.  For these reasons, I suggest that an actuarial tool 
be implemented into general pretrial risk assessment under a quantifiable rule-based 
system, rather than a system based on judicial discretion.
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1. Building a Decision-Making Framework
Within the universe of rule-based pretrial decisionmaking systems, a crucial 
distinction seems to be this: where should the power to set the rules lie?  That is, who 
should control the “decision-making framework”?  New Jersey’s system locates that 
power in the judiciary, through the administrative office of the courts;276 Wiseman’s 
proposal, though informally, would follow the federal sentencing guidelines’ 
example and create an independent bail commission, appointed by the executive but 
removable only for cause.277 The bail commission model has intuitive appeal, but 
the commission should accept greater judicial input than the federal sentencing
commission did.278 Judicial involvement will be crucial, but isolating the decision-
making power within the administrative office of the courts risks perpetuating the 
political and agency costs that the rule-based system is intended to avoid.  An 
independent commission would also be more insulated from the political blowback 
from “bad errors” —crimes committed by defendants on pretrial release—than are 
single judges.
Tailoring and validation of a pretrial risk assessment to Maine’s 
idiosyncrasies—the vast differences (in population density, economic and 
administrative resources, and culture) between Inland/Northern and 
Coastal/Southern Maine must be taken into account in designing and implementing 
risk assessment.  The simplest solution would be to create multiple decision-making 
frameworks to suit the particular needs of different counties.  This tailoring would 
come with minor additional administrative costs, but tailoring would carry 
significant advantages: easing of legitimacy and dignity concerns, greater acceptance 
by judges in rural courts (and commensurately fewer judicial overrides and costs), 
as well as simple fairness.
2.  Incorporating IPV Risk Assessment
The same arguments compelling a rule-based system in the general criminal 
context still apply to IPV cases.  If we approach the problem from the same direction, 
that is one of aggregate fairness, then a rule-based system would ensure that a greater 
number of defendants were receiving fairer treatment.  At the same time, however, 
the harms attendant to IPV prosecution (e.g., alienation, loss of control, and other 
forms of continued harm to victims, not to mention the heightened danger of 
retribution) would worsen under a rule-based bail system, primarily because IPV risk 
assessment deals not with a single individual but with two people and their 
relationship.
We must also account for the impact of different pretrial processes on police 
incentives.  For instance, say Maine adopts a bail commission model that uses the 
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Arnold PSA in most cases and ODARA in cases where police have probable cause 
to believe IPV has occurred.  If police want to increase the likelihood that in a 
borderline case, an arrestee will be detained pretrial, then allowing ODARA to 
supplement the PSA gives police two bites at the apple—they might be inclined to 
get an ODARA score on the off-chance that it is high, even if there isn’t enough 
evidence for a prosecutor to charge any IPV crime.
A system in which judges retain greater discretion in IPV cases could risk IPV 
defendants crowding out other pretrial detainees.  That is, under the current bail 
system, we might assume judges are releasing a greater percentage of IPV defendants 
than they might otherwise release because judges are responding (if only marginally) 
to crowding concerns; but if defendants in other crimes are being released at greater 
rates, that might open up space that judges would then fill with IPV defendants.  
Judges could also increase IPV pretrial detention rates to “compensate” for what they 
might perceive as the bail commission’s excessive leniency.  In other words, if judges 
are anchored to a certain level of pretrial detention, they will seize an opportunity to 
return to that level.  To the extent that intimate partner abusers are more likely than 
defendants in other crimes to recidivate,279 this proportional readjustment may be 
desirable; the concern, though, is that this “compensation” would exceed the higher 
recidivism risk, especially if risk assessment generally “increase[s] the salience of 
recidivism prediction in [judicial] decisionmaking.”280
In the courtroom, however, the revictimization of IPV victims under a rule-
based system may not be substantially greater than under a system in which ODARA 
is instead used as a factor in overcoming a PSA-based presumption of release.  It is 
important here not to confuse revictimization concerns with legitimacy concerns.  
Revictimization is about the loss of agency due to state coercion, no matter what the 
impetus for that coercion; legitimacy concerns are about loss of agency due to the 
mechanical or algorithmic nature of the state’s decisionmaking.  In a rule-based 
pretrial detention proceeding, some degree of revictimization may be unavoidable, 
regardless of whether ODARA or the Arnold PSA is the controlling mechanism. (A 
victim is unlikely to see the difference between the ODARA and a general risk 
assessment tool, at least as far as their own agency is concerned.)281 And while there 
is a strong societal interest in protecting victims, it is not the only goal of criminal 
justice; after all, intimate partner violence “is a crime and not merely a tort.”282
The incorporation of IPV risk assessment into a reformed bail system must 
account for these considerations.  Under a bail commission model, which sets 
                                                                                                     
279. Recidivism rates vary widely from place to place, and are difficult to calculate, but the 
available evidence indicates that IPV offenders’ rearrest rates are somewhat above-average.  See, e.g.,
WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, RECIDIVISM TRENDS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OFFENDERS IN 
WASHINGTON STATE 5 (August 2013), http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/ReportFile/1541/Wsipp_Recidivism-
Trends-of-Domestic-Violence-Offenders-in-Washington-State_Full-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9Y3-
4SWH].
280. Starr, supra note 64, at 865.
281. While it is true that a victim’s statements and circumstances are factors in the ODARA score, 
the specific score calculations need not – and should not – be mentioned in a detention hearing.
282. Bruce Winick, Applying the Law Therapeutically in Domestic Violence Cases, 69 U.M.K.C. L.
REV. 33, 75 (2000).
180 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1
 
presumptions of release and detention based on a general risk assessment tool in all 
cases, IPV risk assessments should serve as supplemental tools—not through a 
mechanical or rule-based process, but through a holistic, judicial, balancing of these 
important concerns.
D.  Intermediate Steps
Even if general bail reform is not to be accomplished in the short term, a few 
enhancements to the ODARA system could still improve outcomes.  Prosecutors 
play an important role in ensuring that ODARA use does not fade.  Consistent 
prosecutorial use of ODARA will encourage police to consistently collect scores, in 
order to avoid blowback from angry prosecutors, and will reinforce consistent 
judicial consideration of scores (among other things, greater judicial experience of 
ODARA would show judges how ODARA might improve their own 
decisionmaking).  At the law enforcement level, clarification of the subtleties in 
ODARA administration (i.e., score-taking) would lead to more consistent 
application; embedding ODARA in police report forms, not just in policy, seems an 
obvious step as well.283
The defense bar could also play a more active role in domestic violence cases.  
ODARA need not be used in a strict detention/no-detention decision: defense 
attorneys might use a higher ODARA score to advocate for rehabilitative or 
alternative measures as well.  For instance, to the extent that an IPV defendant is 
“dangerous” only to the victim, some pretrial tools, such as electronic monitoring, 
may be more appropriate in IPV cases than in other criminal cases.284 Defense 
counsel might also help to reinforce the consistent application and provision of 
ODARA by questioning a prosecutor who fails to provide a score.  Finally, the 
traditional role of defense attorneys is to optimize the outcome in the current case
(that is, to treat the defendant as a one-shotter);285 but the scope of the defense 
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attorney’s role might be expanded in IPV cases to focus on a defendant’s potential 
for repeat arrest.  In these cases, defense counsel might use the ODARA score to 
identify clients whose long-term interests might be best served by some amount of 
rehabilitative or therapeutic measures.286
For judges, the most important short-term improvement would be to synchronize 
ODARA consideration with the wider range of bail conditions available.287 To the 
extent that even in the absence of bail schedules, judges fall into patterns and habits 
in setting bail for certain types of cases, encouraging judicial flexibility and creativity 
in balancing the various rights and dangers at stake in all bail proceedings may 
reduce judicial reliance on cash bail amount as a proxy for dangerousness.  Even 
minor changes, such as reformatting administrative forms, may nudge judges in this 
direction.288 Recent legislation to strengthen the requirement that judges receive and 
consider ODARA scores has stalled.289 While more frequent application and 
consideration of ODARA would likely do little harm, this type of “forced 
consideration” can only do so much to improve outcomes so long as pretrial 
decisionmaking is left almost entirely to judicial discretion.
V. CONCLUSION
Maine’s bail system needs reform.  The alignment of cash bail amounts with the 
severity of the charged crime, with scarce consideration of the defendant’s means—a bail 
schedule in all but name—is outdated, morally troubling, and possibly unconstitutional.  
While actuarial risk assessment will not solve all the system’s ills, a system based on 
statistical analysis, rather than judicial hunches, could do much to restore the presumption 
of innocence. Pretrial detention decisions based on the statistical likelihood of a 
defendant’s being rearrested or failing to appear also better comports with the conception 
of pretrial detention as regulatory or administrative, not punitive.  But the intersection of 
bail reform, actuarial risk assessment, and IPV raises different and more complex 
problems than in other criminal contexts.  Pretrial detention decisions in IPV cases are 
fraught with constitutional, political, emotional, and moral quandaries and will require a 
careful—and different—balancing of the interests at stake.  Maine has taken one step 
towards a fairer pretrial justice system, but it has a good way left to walk.
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